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1 Introduction
This thesis studies the phenomenon of asymmetric pricing, according to which
output prices tend to adapt diﬀerently to input cost increases than to input cost
decreases. Empirically, asymmetric pricing (aka asymmetric price adjustment or
rockets and feathers1) is typically associated with negative cost shocks being passed
along to consumers in a `slower' fashion than positive cost shocks. The general
public as well as government authorities often attribute this pricing behavior to an
abuse of market power, i.e., implicit or explicit collusion. However, to the best of
my knowledge, no formal model capable of generating rockets and feathers through
collusion has been developed. Therefore, the main contribution of my thesis will
be to provide a collusive model of asymmetric price adjustment. Furthermore, I
will summarize several other models of asymmetric pricing that do not rely on an
abuse of market power and compare their results.
Why is asymmetric pricing even a relevant topic, and which support exists for it?
During the last two decades, numerous empirical studies conﬁrmed the so called
pattern of rockets and feathers. Because of the rich amount of data available and
some theoretical reasons that make gasoline a good candidate to test for asym-
metric pricing, many studies have concentrated on the gasoline market. Examples
include Johnson (2002); Bacon (1991); Karrenbrock (1991); Borenstein et al. (1997)
and Lewis (2009). However, there is growing support that asymmetric pricing is
not restricted to few specialized markets, but is a very broad phenomenon. Yang
and Ye (2008, p. 547) state that other markets where adjustment asymmetry can
be found include
1Output prices rise like rockets when there is a positive cost shock, but fall like feathers when
there is a negative one.
fruit and vegetables (Pick et al., 1991; Ward, 1982), beef and pork
(Boyd and Brorsen, 1988; Goodwin and Holt, 1999; Goodwin and
Harper, 2000) and banking (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and
Sharpe, 1992; O'Brien, 2000).
Finally, in his comprehensive study of 77 consumer and 165 producer goods, Peltz-
man (2000) shows that asymmetric pricing can be found in more than two thirds
of the markets he observed. He also points out that positive cost shocks usually
have twice the immediate impact on output prices than negative ones, and that
this asymmetry tends to last for at least ﬁve to eight months.
But while asymmetric price adjustment is found to be common in a great number of
markets, it is not well understood from a theoretical perspective. As a consequence,
modern economic theory seems incomplete and the ﬁeld of asymmetric pricing
could turn out to greatly enhance our understanding of how markets work. As
Peltzman (2000, p. 468) points out:
If [asymmetric pricing] was shown to be general and not just limited
to a few case studies, it would point to a serious gap in a fundamental
area of economic theory.
So which ideas and models are available that can lead to a better understanding
of the phenomenon? First of all, Borenstein et al. (1997) provide three hypotheses
which could explain adjustment asymmetry in gasoline retail. Some of the ideas
mentioned in their paper might easily translate to other markets. Probably most
interesting is the ﬁrst hypothesis, which states that
[p]rices are sticky downward because when input prices fall the old out-
put price oﬀers a natural focal point for oligopolistic sellers. (Boren-
stein et al., 1997, p. 324)
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In brief, ﬁrms in oligopolistic markets could choose to maintain the price charged
before a negative cost shock, as this price provides a focal point for (implicit)
collusion. The idea for this hypothesis stems from the so called `trigger sales'
model of Tirole (1988), however, the economic literature still seems to lack an
explicit formal analysis of this mechanism.2
The principal contribution of my thesis will thus be to try to overcome this theo-
retical deﬁcit by providing a simple model of asymmetric pricing caused by tacit
collusion in a trigger sales context. This will be the focus of the main section of
my thesis. There, I will explain the basic mechanism that leads to asymmetric
price adjustment in my model, describe its setup, prove that a collusive equilib-
rium exists for certain parameter values and present several comparative statics
results. I will then extend the basic model to a multitude of separated submar-
kets and show that this model can reproduce realistic pricing patterns. Finally, I
will point out some possible extensions that could be considered for future research.
In the rest of my thesis, I will explain most other models of asymmetric price
adjustment that are currently available. Which models are these? First of all, the
other proposed hypotheses for asymmetric price adjustment in Borenstein et al.
(1997) were production lags with ﬁnite inventories and a signal extraction problem
for consumers when prices are very volatile in a consumer search scenario. While
2Support for this can be found in Lewis (2009, p. 18), who writes that
No rigorous model of focal price collusion has been speciﬁed, and testing against
the predictions of a super-game model of tacit collusion is diﬃcult since there are
an inﬁnite number of equilibrium price paths.
and Eckert (2002, p. 53), who states that
While a theory linking tacit collusion with an asymmetric response to input prices
has not been formally derived, the intuition has been discussed in the context of
the Green and Porter (1984) model of tacit collusion with price wars.
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the ﬁrst explication has not been examined in detail, consumer search has become
the number one modeling approach for rockets and feathers.
In fact, at least four rigorous models capable of generating `true' rockets and
feathers through consumer search exist. They have been invented by Yang and
Ye (2008); Tappata (2009); Lewis (2009) and Cabral and Fishman (2008). As one
can see, these papers are pretty recent, with the latter two being unpublished as
of now. Although consumer search is the main economic concept which drives
them, they build on diﬀerent assumptions and provide heterogeneous mechanisms
to derive adjustment asymmetry of output prices. I will provide a detailed sum-
mary and comment on limitations and possible extensions of the ﬁrst two models
in Section 4 of my thesis. There, I will also give a brief intuition of how the latter
two models work.
Alternatives to consumer search include the mechanism of production lags with
ﬁnite inventories proposed by Borenstein et al. (1997) as well as the models of
Ball and Mankiw (1994) and Eckert (2002). Ball and Mankiw create a model of
asymmetric pricing through asymmetric menu costs in inﬂationary environments.
However, their model comes with several conceptual problems and is unlikely to
be relevant in most markets. Eckert provides a model of Edgeworth price cycles
that results in a pattern of price changes resembling asymmetric pricing although
prices move independently from costs. Interestingly, an extension of this model
could lead to true asymmetric pricing. See Section 5 for a further discussion of
these three approaches.
The thesis will be organized as follows. In the next section, I will try to give a more
formal deﬁnition of asymmetric pricing, both listing all the relevant types of rockets
and feathers and providing graphical examples. In the main section (Section 3) of
4
this work, I will derive and discuss an own model of asymmetric price adjustment
in a collusive setting. In Section 4 and Section 5, I will proceed to present several
other ideas how to model the phenomenon. I will also discuss problematic aspects
and possible extensions of these ideas. A short summary (Section 6) concludes.
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2 Types of Asymmetric Pricing
Before I will start to present various models of asymmetric pricing, it seems useful
to give the reader a better understanding of how the phenomenon can be under-
stood. In order to do so, I will distinguish between the various types of rockets
and feathers discussed in the literature and provide a formal deﬁnition. Several
diagrams are included for convenience.
The deﬁnition of asymmetric pricing given is based on Karrenbrock's (1991) deﬁni-
tion of asymmetric gasoline price movements and the general deﬁnitions of Meyer
and Cramon-Taubadel (2004, p. 538 ﬀ.). According to the former,
[r]etail price movements are deﬁned as asymmetric if an increase in the
wholesale price aﬀects the retail price diﬀerently than an equal-sized
decrease. (Karrenbrock, 1991, p. 22)
Karrenbrock then proceeds to list three distinct types of asymmetric price ad-
justment. The ﬁrst type deals with the speed of adjustment. If an input price
increase is passed along more quickly than an input price decrease, he refers to
time asymmetry. A typical example for time asymmetry would be an immediate
and full pass-through of positive cost shocks, but a delayed, full pass-through of
negative cost shocks. In other words, an equal amount of some equal-sized, posi-
tive or negative input price change is passed along to output prices eventually, but
adjustment needs longer when prices have decreased. The following ﬁgure taken
from Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel (2004) illustrates this ﬁrst type of adjustment
asymmetry at the top panel, with pin referring to some upstream input price and
pout referring to the output price. The shaded area represents the welfare loss that
is implied for consumers.
6
Figure 2.1 Time, amount and pattern asymmetry. Source: Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel
(2004, p. 584)
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The second type of asymmetry is called amount asymmetry. This means that,
once the adjustment process is over, a higher percentage of an input price increase
will be reﬂected in the new output price, compared to an input price decrease. In
this case, price increases and decreases induce an equally long adjustment process,
but after the phase of transition, output prices will have changed more (in abso-
lute terms) after a positive cost shock than after a negative one. For example,
if after two weeks an input price increase of ten cents results in an output price
increase of eight cents, while an input price decrease of ten cents only results in an
output price decrease of six cents, this can be referred to as amount asymmetry.
A graphical example can be found in the middle panel of Figure 2.1.
It is worth noting that true amount asymmetry is unlikely to prevail in actual
markets. The reason is that input and output prices are usually not indepen-
dent, but aﬀect each other through some kind of equilibrium relation. But true
amount asymmetry implies that prices would drift apart over time, destroying any
projected equilibrium relation. In other words, amount asymmetry can only oc-
cur over the short run, with the long run equilibrium being restored over time.
(Wikipedia, 2009)
The ﬁnal and most important type of asymmetry is a combination of the types
explained above. Price adjustment can diﬀer in its length and amount. For ex-
ample, it might be the case that an input price increase leads to a full output
price increase after one day, while an input price decrease needs three days to be
transmitted, with only 80% of the price change being ﬁnally reﬂected in the new
output price.
But even if both the length and amount of price adjustment are equal, the pat-
terns of the adjustment process can diﬀer. For example, a three-week full price
adjustment after an input price increase of ten cents could be (5, 3, 2) cents,
8
while it might be (2, 4, 4) cents when facing an input price decrease. As this is
also clearly a case of adjustment asymmetry, the third type will be referred to as
pattern asymmetry and includes the combination of time and amount asymmetry
mentioned ﬁrst. For a graphical example, see the bottom panel of Figure 2.1.
The above illustrations might induce the thought that amount asymmetry (or
amount asymmetry combined with time asymmetry, but not pure pattern asym-
metry) is the worst type of adjustment asymmetry, as consumers would have to
bear `inﬁnite' welfare losses. This is obviously not the case, as the net present value
of the welfare loss induced by large time asymmetry might very well exceed the net
present value of the loss induced by small amount asymmetry that persists forever.
As a ﬁnal note, it is important to notice that all of my examples refer to a state
called positive asymmetric price transmission (PAPT), which simply means that
output prices react more quickly (or completely) to input price increases than to
input price decreases. PAPT is the most commonly observed type of adjustment
asymmetry and is the sole focus of my thesis. For the sake of completeness,
the opposite case is called negative asymmetric price transmission and implies
that output prices tend to adjust more rapidly to input price decreases than to
increases, i.e., that there is a welfare redistribution from producers to consumers.
Figure 2.2 showcases this behavior.
A last distinction could also be made between vertical and spatial asymmetric
price transmission, but in my thesis, only vertical relations will be covered.
9
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3 Asymmetric Pricing due to Tacit Collusion in a Simple
Dynamic Oligopoly Model
In this main section of my thesis, I develop a model of asymmetric pricing based
on tacit collusion among ﬁrms. The idea to this stems from the ﬁrst hypothesis
of how asymmetric might emerge proposed in Borenstein et al. (1997). There, the
authors argue that asymmetric pricing might occur because ﬁrms who compete in
Bertrand competition coordinate their selling prices on the price that was charged
before a negative cost shock, but have to immediately increase their prices after
a positive cost shock because margins are squeezed and ﬁrms would have to incur
losses otherwise. Due to random demand shocks, collusion slowly breaks down
after a cost decrease, leading prices to slowly adapt to negative cost shocks. In
contrast, positive cost shocks are transmitted without delay to output prices.
This section will be organized as follows: In Subsection 3.1, I will give a more
detailed intuition of how asymmetric pricing emerges in the model and will outline
its setup. In Subsection 3.2, I will calculate the equilibrium of the static game, i.e.,
the equilibrium of the game when it is not repeated. In Subsection 3.3, I propose a
collusive strategy combination that turns out to be an equilibrium of the dynamic
game. Doing so, I will provide several comparative statics and ultimately show
that asymmetric pricing results for certain parameter values. Next, in Subsection
3.4, I will show that a more realistic pattern of price adjustment can be found
if one thinks of one market to be composed of several separated submarkets, as
has already been proposed in Borenstein et al. (1997). A short summary and
discussion (Subsection 3.5) concludes.
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3.1 Intuition and Model Setup
The basic mechanism which leads to asymmetric pricing in my model is as follows.
After a negative cost shock, ﬁrms witness rising margins. While there could be
ﬁerce competition and a quick negative response of the output price to the cost
shock, ﬁrms can also collude on the price charged before the cost shock because it
provides a natural focal point for collusion.
In traditional models of industrial organization, ﬁrms can observe the prices of all
their competitors3 and thus, depending on some discount factor δ, only one type
of collusive equilibrium is possible. The strategies involved in this equilibrium are
to price at the collusive price whenever all of the other ﬁrms price at the high
price, and to price at cost forever (or at least several periods) as punishment if any
ﬁrm deviates. In this scenario, either all ﬁrms collude forever on some high price
that maximizes their proﬁts or all ﬁrms price at cost (deviation from the collusive
behavior either pays or not, so ﬁrms either have no incentive to deviate in every
period or no collusive equilibrium exists).
However, things change drastically if one introduces imperfect information. If ﬁrms
cannot observe the prices of their rivals, they would have to ﬁnd other mechanisms
to keep their competitors from deviating. One way to do so is by making collu-
sion dependent on sales in previous periods. I will call a strategy that conditions
cooperation on previous sales a trigger sales strategy. The intuition behind such
a strategy is that ﬁrms can infer from low sales that other ﬁrms have broken the
tacit collusive agreement and will end collusion as well. From this, it is only a
3Usually facing a delay of one period.
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small step to asymmetric pricing. If ﬁrms confuse random demand shocks with
changes in demand caused by ﬁrms that deviate from the collusive price4, collusion
can slowly break down due to random demand shocks although every ﬁrm wishes
to collude forever.
In contrast, positive cost shocks are translated without delay because margins are
very small and would become negative otherwise. The result is asymmetric price
transmission: positive cost shocks are transmitted immediately to output prices
whereas negative cost shocks need some time to have a negative eﬀect on prices.
Since demand is random, the source of randomness is crucial for determining the
speed with which collusion breaks down, and how prices react once collusion ends.
In the easiest case, only overall demand is random and all ﬁrms end collusion at
the same time in symmetric equilibria, i.e., when sales fall below some critical
value that is deﬁned by a trigger sales strategy.5 Because of this, all prices in the
market would have to drop sharply and simultaneously once collusion ends. This
behavior is usually not observed in real markets. However, a possible solution to
4For this to be possible, there must be some fraction of uninformed consumers that buy at a ran-
dom ﬁrm because otherwise, ﬁrms can always accurately determine whether some competitor
has deviated to a lower price.
5Another possibility would be that demand is random for every ﬁrm and also overall demand is
random. Unfortunately, it seems that no trigger sales equilibrium can be found for this model.
The reason for this is that if every ﬁrm followed a strategy of deviating when demand falls
under some critical value, a best response to this strategy combination would be to always
price at the collusive price, implying higher proﬁts (if all other ﬁrms do not deviate, a ﬁrm
shouldn't deviate if it faces a random demand shock). Although there are certainly ways to
overcome this issue by introducing beliefs or other sophistications, I will leave this open for
future research.
Also, a two-ﬁrm model can be conceived where overall demand is constant, but each ﬁrm
faces random demand (i.e., overall demand is split randomly among both ﬁrms). In this case,
the strategy combination of playing the collusive price as long as sales do not fall below some
threshold and sales of the other ﬁrm do not fall below the same threshold (which, in this
case, can be inferred from the ﬁrm's own demand) results in an equilibrium. While this would
again imply asymmetric pricing, I will not discuss a model of this type in my thesis.
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this problem is if one thinks of one big `market' to be comprised of several in-
dependent submarkets. This assumption is probably justiﬁed for many `markets'
that are in fact composed of spatially separated submarkets (e.g. in gasoline re-
tail, a city could be deﬁned as one market although there is an inner city market,
suburban market, highway market, etc. with all of those being independent from
each other). In this case, collusion can progressively break down in parts of the
`market' (each with random demand), which leads to a smooth decline of average
market prices.
First, I will provide a model of the former type, i.e., a model where collusion is
maintained for several periods and then suddenly collapses, leading to a full and
abrupt decline of average market prices. Then, I will extend this model to allow
for separated submarkets, resulting in a more realistic pattern of price response to
negative cost shocks.
For the former, consider a market with n ≥ 2 ﬁrms who produce a homogeneous
good at marginal cost c. Firms compete à la Bertrand and try to maximize ex-
pected proﬁts over the current and future periods. Moreover, while ﬁrms can
perfectly observe the demand they faced in every elapsed period, they can never
observe the prices charged by their competitors (both for current and bygone pe-
riods).
Time is discrete, with t = 1, 2, 3, .... The interval between two periods is assumed
to be short (e.g. one day) such that ﬁrms' discount factor is close to one. For
simplicity, I will suppose that ﬁrms do not discount over future periods.6 Each
6In contrast to classic trigger strategy games, the model doesn't rely on discounting because
its structure ensures that diﬀerent cost states will have a ﬁnite expected length. The model
is robust to the introduction of a discount factor as long as it is suﬃciently close to one. For
a short interval between periods, this is a realistic assumption.
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period, the n ﬁrms in the market have to pay either low or high marginal cost
which is common to all ﬁrms, c ∈ {cL, cH}, with cL < cH . Cost states follow a
two-state Markov process with transition probability (ρ, 1− ρ), with ρ > 1/2. Put
diﬀerently, it holds that Pr(ct = cL|ct−1 = cL) = Pr(ct = cH |ct−1 = cH) = ρ > 1/2.
The consumer side is characterized by a continuum of (potential) consumers with
random measure X ∼ U [0, 2]7 that is identically and independently distributed
(i.i.d.) in each period, with E[X] = 1. This random measure is unobservable for
ﬁrms. Also, consumers have a reservation price ν that is equal to cH , i.e., ν = cH ,
and unit demand in each period. A fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of consumers is informed
and observes all prices in the market. These consumers are called shoppers and
buy at the lowest priced ﬁrm (if two or more ﬁrms have the same lowest price,
shoppers buy at one of the ﬁrms at random). The remaining fraction 1 − λ of
nonshoppers only observes one random price and thus buys at a random ﬁrm.
Consumers do not buy if a price exceeds their reservation price ν. Note that my
model is a partial equilibrium model: while ﬁrms behave optimally, consumers
can only decide whether to buy or not. For models where the search decision of
consumers is endogenous, see Section 4.
The parameters n, λ, ρ, cL, cH , ν as well as the distribution of potential consumers
are assumed to be common knowledge.
Because of the above assumptions, the expected demand of some ﬁrm i, pricing at
p ≤ ν, can be written as
7The uniform distribution is mainly chosen for technical convenience because it has a simple
and closed form cumulative distribution function. In principle, every continuous distribution
with a bounded or semi-inﬁnite interval that has zero as lower bound can be chosen. If
minimum market demand is greater than zero, it depends on the model parameters whether
a collusive equilibrium can exist.
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E(Di|p) =
 E[(λb +
(1−λ)
n
)X] = λ
b
+ 1−λ
n
|if p = pmin
E[( (1−λ)
n
)X] = 1−λ
n
|if p > pmin
(3.1)
where pmin = min{p1, ..., pn} and a total of 1 ≤ b ≤ n ﬁrms price at pmin.
In what follows, I will derive Nash-equilibria for the stage game8 and, building
on this, the dynamic game where the stage game is repeated inﬁnitely. Once
equilibrium for the dynamic game in the market has been derived, I will proceed
to analyze the eﬀect on average market prices when there are multiple separated
submarkets.
3.2 Equilibrium of the Stage Game
If the above game is only played for one period (i.e., only for t = 1), the strategy
space of ﬁrms is restricted to either price at some level for sure (playing a pure
strategy) or to randomize between prices (playing a mixed strategy).
It is straightforward to see that there can be no symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies if c = cL < ν. The reason for this is an undercutting argument. Suppose
every ﬁrm played some pure strategy p ∈ (cL, ν]. Then each ﬁrm would have an
incentive to slightly undercut all of its rivals because it can increase its expected
demand without eﬀectively decreasing its proﬁt margin. This goes on until every
ﬁrm would price at cL, driving proﬁts to zero. But then again, each ﬁrm would
have an incentive to price at some higher price and make a positive proﬁt by getting
positive expected demand of 1−λ
n
from the nonshoppers. Therefore, no equilibrium
in pure strategies can exist if costs are low.
On the other hand, if c = cH = ν, in principle every price that is greater or equal to
the valuation of consumers ν can be played as equilibrium strategy, each resulting
8For this, I will use a methodology similar to Varian (1980).
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in a proﬁt of zero. I will restrict the action space of ﬁrms such that they cannot
price above ν.9 Doing so, the only equilibrium of the stage game when costs are
high is that every ﬁrm prices at ν. This is a crucial feature of the model: only
because ﬁrms do not randomize over prices under high costs, there exists a unique
focal point for collusion (i.e., p = ν) once costs drop.
Because of the above result that there can be no pure strategy equilibrium of
the stage game if costs are low, in any symmetric low cost equilibrium, ﬁrms will
have to price using a probability distribution F (p) := Pr(p˜ ≤ p) with support
[p, p = ν].10 The trade-oﬀ between attracting shoppers and extracting high proﬁts
from non-shoppers is resolved by using mixed strategies. In equilibrium, surplus-
appropriation must be balanced by business-stealing eﬀects, which is only possible
when ﬁrms randomize between prices (see Varian, 1980; Tappata, 2009, p. 677).
The equilibrium price distribution can now be calculated by the following logic:
playing the mixed strategy of F (p) can only be optimal if any price in the support
[p, p = ν] yields the same expected proﬁt. Otherwise, the mixed strategy F (p)
could proﬁtably be altered by choosing prices that generate lower proﬁts less fre-
quently. Since ν is clearly in the pricing support of ﬁrms, it must hold in particular
that setting any price p in the support has to yield the same expected proﬁt as
setting p = ν. Formally, for F (p) to be an equilibrium strategy it must hold that
E(Πi(p;F (p)) = E(Πi(v;F (p)), (3.2)
9This can be motivated if one assumes ﬁrms to strictly prefer positive demand over zero demand.
10ν has to be the highest price in the support because it would make no sense for a ﬁrm to price
at p if p < ν: the ﬁrm would not attract any informed consumers anyway and could thus
make a higher proﬁt by pricing at ν.
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where Πi(x;F (p)) denotes the proﬁt of ﬁrm i if it prices at x, given that all other
ﬁrms in the market price according to the probability distribution function F (p).
Using the expected demand function of ﬁrms given by Equation (3.1) and realizing
that b = 1 when all other ﬁrms price according to F (p) (which has no mass
points11), the left hand side of Equation (3.2) is given by
E(Πi(p;F (p)) = (p− cL)[E(Di|p = pmin) Pr(p = pmin) + E(Di|p > pmin) Pr(p > pmin)]
= (p− cL)
[
λn+ 1− λ
n
(1− F (p))n−1 + 1− λ
n
(1− (1− F (p))n−1)
]
= (p− cL)
[
λ(1− F (p))n−1 + 1− λ
n
]
.
From this it immediately follows that the right hand side of Equation (3.2) can be
written as
E(Πi(ν;F (p)) = (ν − cL)1− λ
n
.
Setting both sides equal and rearranging ﬁnally yields
F (p) = 1− n−1
√(
ν − p
p− cL
)
1− λ
λn
. (3.3)
Using that F (p) = 0, one can also solve Equation (3.3) for p. It holds that
p =
ν(1− λ) + λncL
1− λ+ λn > cL. (3.4)
11A rigorous proof for this can be found in Varian (1980).
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One can see that p will only reach cL if λ = 1 (i.e., every consumer is informed)
or n → ∞. Interestingly, the equilibrium of the stage game collapses to a full
competition Bertrand equilibrium when λ = 1, but ends up in the monopoly case
(with each ﬁrm pricing at ν) when there is an `inﬁnite' number of ﬁrms in the
market. This is because the expected proﬁt from business-stealing decreases with
a higher rate than the expected proﬁt from surplus-appropriation for increasing
n, i.e., having the lowest price in the market will pay less and less for higher n.
Of course, the game will also collapse to the monopoly outcome if the fraction of
informed consumers λ is zero.
3.3 Equilibrium of the Dynamic Game
Now that the equilibrium strategies for the static game have been determined,
I will proceed to propose a collusive equilibrium for the dynamic game, i.e., the
stage game when it is repeated inﬁnitely.
First of all, it is straightforward to see that the strategy combination of pricing
at p = ν whenever c = cH and pricing according to F (p) whenever c = cL clearly
constitutes a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium of the supergame. This is because
by deﬁnition, the equilibrium of the stage game must be an equilibrium of every
stage (period). Thus, if other equilibria for the dynamic game exist, it is in
principle impossible to pin down which equilibrium will be played. In fact, the
well known Folk theorem states that in repeated games, any strategy combination
can constitute an equilibrium as long as each player'sminimax condition is fulﬁlled,
meaning that each player minimizes their maximal loss. (See Wikipedia, 2010, and
the references therein)
More speciﬁcally, if costs drop and ﬁrms want to collude on some high price to
keep their margins at a high level, there are generally inﬁnitely many prices ﬁrms
can collude on in equilibrium, rendering it unclear how they can coordinate on
one particular price. Because of this, I will only examine equilibria where ﬁrms'
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collude on the price that was charged before a negative cost shock, as it provides
a natural focal point for collusion. It seems plausible that, if there is no other in-
formation available, ﬁrms' best guess would be to keep prices unchanged in order
to coordinate their selling prices after a cost decrease.
Also, among all possible collusive equilibria, I will only consider trigger sales equi-
libria in which ﬁrms' proﬁts are maximized. As will turn out below, this implies
that, depending on the parameters n and λ in the market, either the equilibrium
of the stage game will be played in every period (I will call such markets `ﬁerce', as
ﬁrms engage in ﬁerce competition) or a collusive trigger sales equilibrium emerges
(I will call such markets `collusive').
I will now prove that, for some values of n and λ, the following trigger sales strategy
combination constitutes a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium:
 Price at p = ν whenever c = cH .
 Price at p = ν in the ﬁrst period after costs drop from cH to cL.
 Price at p = ν in subsequent periods where c = cL as long as the demand
faced in every elapsed period (where c = cL) exceeded a critical value k, with
0 < k < 2
(
1−λ
n
)
.12 If demand has been lower than k in some period, price
according to the equilibrium of the low cost static game (i.e., price according
to F (p)) until costs rise to cH again.
12A minimum demand of zero (implying that ﬁrms always collude) can never be an equilibrium,
as will be outlined below. 2
(
1−λ
n
)
is the maximum demand (demand if X = 2) a ﬁrm
can face if some other ﬁrm has deviated by undercutting. Because of this, a strategy of
breaking collusion conditional on having witnessed a demand greater or equal to this value
(i.e., k ≥ 2 ( 1−λn )) makes no sense. This is because for X ∈ [2 ( 1−λn ) , k], ﬁrms would break
collusion as punishment even though they would know with certainty that every other ﬁrm
in the market colluded in the previous period.
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As will be shown, there is generally a continuum of values of k (and therefore in-
ﬁnitely many trigger sales strategies) that result in an equilibrium of the dynamic
game. However, as mentioned above, I will determine k endogenously by assuming
that ﬁrms collude on the value of k that maximizes their expected proﬁts while
still keeping ﬁrms from deviating.
Which value of k is that? In a world with perfect information, ﬁrms would observe
overall market demand and could therefore accurately deduct whether low demand
is caused by some rival ﬁrm undercutting or a random demand shock. However, in
the model ﬁrms do not get to know the random demand (which ranges from 0 to
2) and will thus have to break collusion if demand falls below some critical value
k > 0 even if every ﬁrm wishes to collude. Otherwise, it would pay to deviate
because if there is no punishment for deviation, it must always be proﬁtable to do
so: all other ﬁrms would keep playing ν anyway no matter how low their demand
gets.
The optimal (proﬁt maximizing) value of k is thus given by the minimal k (say k∗)
that is still incentive compatible with not deviating from the collusive strategy.
This is because the lower k, the less likely it is that market demand falls below
this threshold value despite of every ﬁrm colluding.
Having outlined the intuition behind the critical value k, some preliminary results
are needed to determine combinations of the number of ﬁrms n, persistence pa-
rameter ρ, number of informed consumers λ and critical value k that allow for a
collusive equilibrium.
I will denote by q the probability that demand reaches at least k for any ﬁrm
playing ν if all other ﬁrms play ν. As the measure of potential consumers is
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random, X ∼ U [0, 2], the demand for such a ﬁrm is random as well, with Di =
(λ
n
+ (1−λ)
n
)X = X
n
. Now q := Pr(Di ≥ k|ν; ν) = Pr(Xn ≥ k) = 1 − Pr(X < nk).
Using the distribution function of a uniformly distributed random variable with
support [0, 2], it follows that
q = 1− nk
2
(3.5)
if 0 < k < 2
(
1−λ
n
)
, as assumed.
Analogously, I will denote by r the probability that demand reaches at least k for
any ﬁrm playing ν if at least one other ﬁrm undercuts and plays ν − . It holds
that r := Pr(Di ≥ k|ν; pmin < ν) = Pr((1−λn )X ≥ k) = 1 − Pr(X < nk1−λ). Again
using the distribution function of uniformly distributed random variables, one gets
r = 1− nk
2(1− λ) (3.6)
if 0 < k < 2
(
1−λ
n
)
, as assumed. It can clearly be seen that r must be smaller than
q for λ > 0, as should be expected.
As mentioned above, 2
(
1−λ
n
)
is the maximum demand (demand if X = 2) a
colluding ﬁrm can get if some other ﬁrm deviates, as the fraction λ of informed
consumers would never be attracted. Threshold values of k greater or equal to
2
(
1−λ
n
)
would thus result in a range of demand where collusion would be broken
as punishment although ﬁrms know that every ﬁrm has colluded in the previous
period with certainty. These paradox values of k are excluded in this analysis.
Next, since there is an expected total market demand of 1, the expected demand
for a ﬁrm if every ﬁrm colludes is equal to 1
n
. This means that the expected proﬁt
during collusion is ν−cL
n
for every ﬁrm if cost is low. It was also calculated that the
expected proﬁt for a ﬁrm playing any price in the pricing support [p, ν] must be
equal to (ν − cL)1−λn if there is no collusion. Once collusion ends and ﬁrms begin
to price according to F (p), each ﬁrm's proﬁt will therefore be this high.
22
The only proﬁt that is yet missing is the expected proﬁt a ﬁrm makes when it
deviates from a collusive strategy combination. The best possible deviation is to
price at p = ν − , with  close to zero. Doing so, a ﬁrm attracts all of the in-
formed consumers without eﬀectively facing a decrease of its proﬁt margin. That
is, a deviating ﬁrm will make an expected proﬁt of (ν − cL)λn+1−λn .
Overall, collusion under low cost can thus be maintained if the expected proﬁt
stream of a ﬁrm playing the strategy outlined on page 20 exceeds the expected
proﬁt stream of optimally deviating from the proposed strategy.13 In any period,
such an optimal deviation is characterized by playing p = ν − . Also, if deviation
in any period is optimal, it must be optimal in every period since ﬁrms face the
same maximization problem. This leads to the following
Proposition 3.1. In the dynamic game, there exists a continuum of subgame
perfect Nash-equilibria with demand threshold k if ρ > n−1
λn
. The proﬁt maximizing
threshold value k∗ that is still incentive compatible with collusion is given by
k∗ =
2(1− 1
n
)( 1
ρ
−1)
1
1−λ−n
.
Proof. First, as ﬁrms' actions are restricted to pricing below or equal to ν, setting
p = ν in every period of high costs is the only possible action ﬁrms can under-
take under high costs. Pricing at ν under c = cH is thus clearly subgame perfect.
Second, if costs are low, no matter what a ﬁrm has done in previous periods, it
knows whether all of its competitors will keep pricing at ν in the current period
(if demand has been greater than k in every elapsed period of low costs) or will
price according to F (p) (if demand has been low enough in some bygone low cost
period).
13Recall that I assume for simplicity that ﬁrms do not discount.
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In the former case, if colluding (i.e., pricing at ν) is incentive compatible for a ﬁrm
given that all other ﬁrms price at ν, it must be incentive compatible no matter how
many periods of low costs have already elapsed, as the random process costs follow
is memoryless : for τ > 0, it holds that E(ct = cL|c1, ..., ct−1 = cL) = E(ct+τ =
cL|c1, ..., ct+τ−1 = cL) = ρ. This implies that ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to keep colluding
in any period of low costs if colluding is incentive compatible at all.
In the latter case, if a ﬁrm knows that every competitor will price according to the
stage game equilibrium F (p) until costs rise to cH again, any price in the support
[p, p = ν] constitutes a best response, as each price would yield the same expected
proﬁt. In particular, randomizing according to F (p) must clearly be optimal.
I have thus proven that a trigger sales strategy as proposed will constitute a sub-
game perfect Nash-equilibrium of the dynamic game if colluding is incentive com-
patible for ﬁrms. When is that?
For collusion to be sustainable, it must hold that that the expected proﬁt stream
of collusion exceeds the expected proﬁt stream of optimally deviating. Using the
above results, it is clear that colluding in the ﬁrst period where costs are low, given
that all other ﬁrms collude, yields an expected proﬁt of ν−cL
n
, whereas deviating
in the ﬁrst period yields an expected proﬁt of (ν − cL)λn+1−λn .
Costs remain low for another period with probability ρ (with probability 1 − ρ,
costs change to cH and the ﬁrms' strategies are reset). Also, demand has only been
higher than the critical threshold value k with probability q in the ﬁrst period if
every ﬁrm colluded. Thus, with probability q, a ﬁrm will continue to make an
expected proﬁt of ν−cL
n
, whereas with probability 1 − q, it will only make the ex-
pected proﬁt of the stage game equilibrium, i.e., (ν−cL)1−λn . In sum, the expected
second period proﬁt for a colluding ﬁrm is equal to ρ[ν−cL
n
q + (ν − cL)1−λn (1− q)].
On the other hand, if a ﬁrm deviated in the ﬁrst period, demand only exceeded the
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threshold value k with probability r < q. Thus, such a ﬁrm will continue to make
the deviating proﬁt of (ν − cL)λn+1−λn with probability r. With probability 1− r,
a deviating ﬁrm will only make the expected proﬁt of the stage game equilibrium
(ν − cL)1−λn , as does the colluding ﬁrm with probability 1− q < 1− r.
After this, a third period of low costs only happens with the ex ante probability of
ρ2. Also, since the measure of (potential) consumers is assumed to be i.i.d. across
periods, it is obvious that the probability of ﬁrms having witnessed a demand
greater or equal than k in both elapsed periods (of low costs) must be either q2 (if
the ﬁrm colludes) or r2 (if the ﬁrm deviates), and so on.
Formally, for collusion to be sustainable it must therefore hold that
ν − cL
n
+ ρ
[
ν − cL
n
q + (ν − cL)1− λ
n
(1− q)
]
+
+ ρ2
[
ν − cL
n
q2 + (ν − cL)1− λ
n
(1− q2)
]
+ ... ≥
(ν − cL)λn+ 1− λ
n
+ ρ
[
(ν − cL)λn+ 1− λ
n
r + (ν − cL)1− λ
n
(1− r)
]
+
+ ρ2
[
(ν − cL)λn+ 1− λ
n
r2 + (ν − cL)1− λ
n
(1− r2)
]
+ ...
Multiplying by n
ν−cL and using that q
τ + (1− λ)(1− qτ ) = 1− λ+ λqτ , as well as
(λn+ 1− λ)rτ + (1− λ)(1− rτ ) = 1− λ+ λnrτ , this expression simpliﬁes to
1 + ρ(1− λ+ λq) + ρ2(1− λ+ λq2) + ... ≥
(λn+ 1− λ) + ρ(1− λ+ λnr) + ρ2(1− λ+ λnr2) + ...
25
1 + λ[ρq + (ρq)2 + ...] ≥ λn+ 1− λ+ λn[ρr + (ρr)2 + ...]
λ[1 + ρq + (ρq)2 + ...] ≥ λn[1 + ρr + (ρr)2 + ...]
which ﬁnally results in
ρ ≥ n− 1
nq − r . (3.7)
Now, depending on the model parameters n and λ, two cases can be discerned
when solving inequality (3.7) for k.
First, if λ ≤ 1 − 1
n
, no value of k exists that results in a trigger sales equilibrium
for any ρ < 1. In consequence, the reversal of this inequality,
λ > 1− 1
n
, (3.8)
gives a necessary condition for a collusive equilibrium under a trigger sales strat-
egy. In case the above condition is not satisﬁed, the equilibrium of the stage game
(i.e., all ﬁrms price according to F (p)) will be the only possible outcome in each
low cost period if one restricts trigger sales strategies as the only alternative to
F (p).
Second, if λ > 1− 1
n
, it follows that
k ≥ 2(1−
1
n
)(1
ρ
− 1)
1
1−λ − n
. (3.9)
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Using that k is not allowed to reach or exceed 2
(
1−λ
n
)
, the minimum ρ that is
necessary for collusion can easily be computed. Setting k = 2
(
1−λ
n
)
and solving
condition (3.9) for ρ leads to
ρ >
n− 1
λn
:= ρmin, (3.10)
which is the value that was stated in the proposition.
What is now the minimum value of k that allows for a collusive equilibrium? This
value, say k∗, is given by inequality 3.9 solved for strict equality if (and only if) ρ
exceeds the ρmin that is given by condition (3.10). Formally, it holds that
k∗ =
2(1− 1
n
)(1
ρ
− 1)
1
1−λ − n
if ρ >
n− 1
λn
(3.11)
which is again the expression found in the above proposition.
If ρ > n−1
λn
, every trigger sales strategy that uses a k∗ as deﬁned in Equation
(3.11) must constitute the optimal (in terms of ﬁrms' proﬁts) collusive trigger
sales strategy. I have thus proven that, given that the exogenous parameters n,
λ and ρ of a market fulﬁll a certain criterium, a continuum of collusive, subgame
perfect Nash-equilibria of the game exist. The optimal demand threshold k∗ is
given by the minimum value of k that is still incentive compatible with collusion.
A graphical example for parameter values that constitute collusive equilibria and
the minimum collusive demand threshold k∗ can be found in Figure 3.1.
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As a side note, reexpressing inequality (3.10) to ρ >
1− 1
n
λ
, one can see that, given
some ﬁxed persistence parameter ρ, the fraction of informed consumers λ has to
increase for an increasing number of ﬁrms in the market in order for collusion to
be sustainable. This result is obtained because the absolute diﬀerence in proﬁts
under collusion (expected proﬁt from collusion when some ﬁrm deviates vs. ex-
pected proﬁt from collusion when all other ﬁrms collude) is given by λ
n
in each
period, which is increasing in λ and decreasing in n. Given some ﬁxed persistence
parameter ρ, λ must therefore increase for an increased n in order to keep a col-
luding ﬁrm's ability to detect deviation on the same level.
The interpretation of this is that the signal extraction problem ﬁrms have to face
when determining whether demand is low because of some random demand shock
or because of a rival ﬁrm undercutting gets worse the smaller the number of in-
formed consumers λ relative to the number of ﬁrms in the market n. If λ is small,
ﬁrms have essentially no chance to successfully punish deviating ﬁrms and no equi-
librium using a trigger sales strategy as proposed can exist. This signal extraction
diﬃculty implies that a larger number of ﬁrms in the market needs to be balanced
by a higher proportion of informed consumers.
Having determined k∗, in what follows, I will analyze the eﬀect of the parameters
ρ, n and λ on k∗. Then, I will translate the variable k∗ back into a probability q∗
that can be interpreted as the minimum probability with which ﬁrms end collusion
because of random demand shocks in a cooperative equilibrium. This probability
will ﬁnally be used to determine the speed with which negative cost shocks are
passed along to prices.
The ﬁrst thing one can see is that k∗ is inversely related to ρ. The higher the
persistence of costs, the lower minimum demand is needed to sustain collusion.
This result is not surprising: the higher the probability that low costs persist, the
higher the incentive for ﬁrms to keep colluding and not inducing a high risk of
collusion to break by deviating.
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Next, it is again straightforward to see that k∗ is inversely related to λ. This shows
that more informed consumers lead to a lower minimum demand needed for a col-
lusive equilibrium. This property is consistent with the fact that more informed
consumers make it easier for ﬁrms to distinguish between random demand shocks
and demand shocks caused by a rival ﬁrm undercutting.
Finally, as the nominator of k∗ is increasing and its denominator is decreasing in n,
k∗ is positively related to n. This means that the absolute demand threshold above
which collusion can be maintained must increase in n although the expected num-
ber of consumers per ﬁrm under collusion decreases for a larger number of ﬁrms
in the market. More competition thus leads to a smaller range of threshold val-
ues which are compatible with collusion, i.e., collusion gets more diﬃcult until no
collusive trigger sales equilibrium exists anymore. Similar results are typical for
many models of industrial organization.
In order to understand the degree of asymmetric pricing in the model, I will now
express the probability q∗ of an additional collusive period that is associated with
k∗. If k∗ exists (i.e., Equation (3.11) holds), one can use Equation (3.5) to solve
for q∗. Doing so, it follows that
q∗ =
λ− 1
ρ
(n− 1)(1− λ)
1− n(1− λ) . (3.12)
This leads to the following
Corollary 3.2. If a collusive trigger sales equilibrium with threshold value k∗
exists, the probability that collusion breaks down after at most j periods of low
costs is given by ψ(j) := 1− (q∗)j−1. This probability is
 decreasing with the persistence of costs ρ,
 decreasing with the fraction of informed consumers λ
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 and increasing with the number of ﬁrms n
in the market.
Proof. If every ﬁrm colludes at k∗, the probability that the random measure of
consumers X falls below k∗ will be the same in each period. Thus, considering
that collusion can never break down in the ﬁrst period of low costs, the probability
that collusion is maintained for at least j periods is equal to (q∗)j−1. Consequently,
the probability that collusion breaks down after at most j periods must be given
by 1 − (q∗)j−1. The second part of the above corollary follows from q = 1 − k
2
.
Thus, the comparative statics of q∗ must be opposite to those of k∗: the probability
q∗ that collusion is maintained for another period is increasing with ρ and λ and
decreasing with n. As ψ is decreasing in q∗, ψ must ﬁnally be decreasing with ρ
and λ and increasing with n.
Finally, it follows
Corollary 3.3. Asymmetric pricing does emerge in the model as long as ρ > n−1
λn
.
Positive cost shocks are passed along immediately to output prices whereas negative
cost shocks are transmitted after an expected φ := 1
1−q∗ > 1 periods.
Proof. The mechanism that leads to asymmetric pricing is very straightforward.
If a positive cost shock happens, margins are squeezed and ﬁrms have to increase
their selling prices immediately to ν in order to avoid incurring losses (in fact,
ﬁrms have to price at ν because their action space is restricted to pricing equal to
or below ν).
If a negative cost shock happens, a collusive equilibrium will be played if ρ > n−1
λn
.
Then, costs are sticky in the ﬁrst period, meaning that no ﬁrm has an incentive
to price lower than ν under collusion. In every period that follows where costs
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remain low, demand will be high enough to maintain collusion with probability q∗.
With probability 1−q∗, due to a random demand shock, demand drops suﬃciently
to lead ﬁrms to deviate as punishment, as they confuse random demand shocks
with demand shocks caused by a rival ﬁrm undercutting. This implies that the
probability that collusion breaks down exactly j periods after a negative cost
shock is geometrically distributed with probability parameter 1− q∗, i.e., given by
(q∗)j−1(1− q∗) for j > 0 and zero if j = 0. As the expectation of a geometrically
distributed random variable with probability parameter 1 − q∗ is given by 1
1−q∗ ,
this proves that prices will need an expected φ = 1
1−q∗ > 1 periods to adjust after
a negative cost shock, implying asymmetric pricing.
For example, for n = 2, λ = 0.8 (like in Figure 3.1) and ρ = 0.75, one obtains
q∗ = 8/9 and φ = 9. Collusion will thus break an expected nine periods (e.g.
days) after a negative cost shock, whereas prices will immediately jump to ν after
a positive cost shock (if ﬁrms priced according to F (p)). A graphical depiction of
the resulting probability distribution function of the number of low cost periods
until collusion breaks down in the above example can be found in Figure 3.2.
While collusion will not break down deterministically in a collusive equilibrium,
once collusion breaks down, every ﬁrm in the market will immediately price like
in the competitive equilibrium. This would lead to an abrupt decline of average
market prices once collusion ends, as can clearly be seen in the simulation I depict
in Figure 3.3. In the next subsection, I will discuss the pattern of asymmetric
price transmission that emerges when one market consists of multiple independent
submarkets.
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3.4 Asymmetric Pricing with Separated Submarkets
For this subsection, consider the following extension of the model. Now, the whole
market consists of a total of N ﬁrms who share the same cost level c ∈ {cL, cH = ν}
in every period, with costs evolving according to the same two-state Markov pro-
cess as in the basic model. The market is divided into a = 1, ...,m spatially
separated and completely independent submarkets with na ≥ 2 ﬁrms each, such
that N =
∑m
a=1 na. Firms compete through Bertrand competition in the submar-
kets only.
Also, for the consumer side, each market consists of λa ∈ (0, 1) informed con-
sumers who observe all prices in the market, and 1 − λa uninformed consumers
who only observe one price at random. Demand in each submarket follows the
same principles outlined in Subsection 3.1.
In other words, each submarket is deﬁned by the very same structure as the whole
market in the basic model, and there is no interaction between the submarkets
whatsoever. Because of this, the analysis of the extension of the basic model will
be very simple: depending on the model parameters na and λa of a submarket, each
result of the simple model will directly translate to the extended one: if ρ ≤ na−1
λana
,
a submarket will be characterized by ﬁerce competition and symmetric pricing,
i.e., with every ﬁrm pricing according to the equilibrium of the stage game in each
period. If, however, it holds that ρ > na−1
λana
, a submarket will be characterized by a
collusive trigger sales equilibrium with threshold value k∗a(na, λa) and asymmetric
pricing, i.e., with ﬁrms adjusting prices to negative cost shocks after an expected
1
1−q∗a(na,λa) periods, in contrast to an immediate response to positive cost shocks.
Overall, the response of average prices to negative cost shocks will be diﬀerent than
in the simple model. Depending on how the parameters na and λa are distributed
across submarkets, 0 ≤ l ≤ m of the submarkets will be characterized by collusive
35
equilibria and asymmetric pricing. On the other hand, m − l of the submarkets
will engage in ﬁerce competition (where every ﬁrm plays F (p) under low costs)
and symmetric pricing.
As a consequence, the probability that 0 ≤ κ ≤ l of the l collusive submarkets
end up in ﬁerce competition after at most j periods of low costs would be com-
plicated to determine, as diﬀerent values of na and λa across submarkets would
imply diﬀerent probabilities q∗a(na, λa) with which collusion is maintained, which
in turn would imply diﬀerent values of the probability that collusion is maintained
for at most j periods ψ(j) = ψ(j;na, λa) for each submarket. Hence the number of
collusive submarkets where collusion has ended after j periods would be a sum of l
Bernoulli-distributed random variables with diﬀerent probability parameter ψ(j).
While I will use values of na and λa that vary across submarkets in the simulation
at the end of this subsection, I will not derive the probability with which collusion
breaks down in κ of the l collusive submarkets after j periods of low costs if the
collusive submarkets have diﬀerent parameters na and λa.
However, if the parameters na and λa are the same for each collusive submar-
ket, also q∗ and hence ψ(j) are the same for each submarket and the number of
submarkets where collusion has broken down after (at most) j periods is simply
binomially distributed with probability parameter ψ(j). That is, it must hold that
Pr(Z(j) = κ) =
(
l
κ
)
ψ(j)κ(1− ψ(j))l−κ =
(
l
κ
)
[1− (q∗)j−1]κ[(q∗)j−1]l−κ (3.13)
with Z(j) denoting the number of submarkets where collusion has broken down
after j periods of low costs.
Also, in expectation, lψ = l[1− (q∗)j−1] of the collusive submarkets will engage in
ﬁerce competition after j periods, which is increasing in j.
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Figure 3.4 depicts the probability mass function of the number of collusive sub-
markets where collusion has collapsed after j = 2, 3, 5, 10 and 20 periods of low
costs. The parameters involved are: na = 4 and λa = 0.9 for every collusive sub-
market (implying that q∗ = 0.782 for every submarket), ρ = 0.85, l = 50. One
can clearly observe that the expected number of ﬁrms that quit collusion increases
for the number of elapsed low cost periods j. As the number of submarkets where
collusion is maintained will reduce gradually in expectation, average market prices
for the whole market will decrease in expectation if c = cL persists.
Thus, given that there are l collusive and m− l ﬁerce submarkets, a negative cost
shock will have the following eﬀect:
 In the ﬁrst period, prices will drop to F (p) for all the submarkets which
are characterized by ﬁerce competition, implying that average market prices
drop to some extent in the ﬁrst period of low costs.
 In every period that follows, some of the collusive submarkets will quit coop-
eration in expectation, leading to a gradual decline of average market prices.
 This goes on until either every ﬁrm in the whole market prices according to
F (p) (implying that average market prices have reached their minimum) or
costs rise back to cH .
Finally, the pattern of asymmetric price transmission that is observed in many
markets becomes apparent: Positive costs shocks are immediately passed along to
output prices whereas negative cost shocks are only partly passed along to output
prices in the ﬁrst period and then continue to decline gradually in expectation
until their minimum is reached when every ﬁrm prices according to F (p).
Figure 3.5 shows a simulation of the behavior of average market prices during a
period of four weeks (28 days), in which each hour a cost shock can happen with
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probability 0.02. The following parameters were used: cL = 70, cH = ν = 80,
ρ = 0.98, na ∼ P (1) + 2 (implying an expected three ﬁrms in every submarket),
λa ∼ U [0.6, 1] and m = 50. The overall number of ﬁrms that was the result of
this simulation wasN = 151, while l = 41 of them = 50 submarkets were collusive.
One can see that prices do indeed follow an asymmetric transmission pattern: av-
erage prices rise instantaneously to ν if costs rise to cH . In contrast, after negative
cost shocks, there is only a partial immediate eﬀect on average prices because out
of the m = 50 submarkets in the market, only nine are characterized by ﬁerce com-
petition (with those immediately pricing according to F (p) whenever costs drop
to cL).
After this initial reaction, average prices continue to decline because of random
demand shocks that lead collusion to successively break down in the other, col-
lusive submarkets. Overall, asymmetric pricing is present: negative cost shocks
need much longer to be fully14 transmitted to output prices than positive ones.
The corresponding pattern of how collusion breaks down in the submarkets in
order to produce Figure 3.5 can be found in Figure 3.6.
14It has to be noted that even in the competitive scenario, average prices will never reach costs
under the low cost regime: after all, ﬁrms price according to F (p) with a minimum price of
p > cL (see Subsection 3.2). Because of this, average prices will typically be somewhere in
the middle of cL and cH = ν even if none of the ﬁrms collude.
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3.5 Summary and Discussion
In this section, I have developed a trigger sales model able to generate asymmetric
price transmission caused by oligopolistic coordination. After negative cost shocks,
ﬁrms use the price charged under high costs as focal point for collusion. However,
ﬁrms confuse random demand shocks with demand shocks caused by rival ﬁrms un-
dercutting. In consequence, collusion can break down although every ﬁrm wishes
to collude. In the simple model, collusion will break down at once, leading to a
sudden and full decline of average market prices once collusion ends. In contrast, if
one assumes that markets are composed of several spatially separated submarkets,
average market prices can decline smoothly after a negative cost shock. In the
ﬁrst period after a shock, prices will drop to some extent because of submarkets
where collusion is impossible. In every low cost period that follows, the expected
number of submarkets where collusion has ended increases, implying that average
market prices will decline in a smooth fashion if the number of submarkets in a
market is relatively large.
There are several implications of my model that can be tested empirically. First,
collusive equilibria and thus asymmetric pricing under collusion should only be
found if the number of informed consumers is large, relative to the number of
ﬁrms in a market. Even for small numbers of ﬁrms in a market, high fractions
of informed consumers are needed to allow for asymmetric pricing. Next, I cal-
culated that the speed with which negative cost shocks are transmitted to output
prices decreases for a higher persistence of costs and larger fractions of informed
consumers, but increases for a larger number of ﬁrms in a market.
While the ﬁrst and third of these comparative statics are intuitively straightfor-
ward, the second result is somewhat strange: the more informed consumers there
are in a market, the faster cost changes are generally expected to be reﬂected in
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output prices. However, a larger fraction of informed consumers does in fact facil-
itate collusion in the model as it makes it easier for ﬁrms to monitor the action of
their competitors. This eﬀect outweighs the increased incentive for ﬁrms to deviate
from a collusive equilibrium, which in turn leads a larger proportion of informed
consumers to imply a slower response of output prices to negative cost shocks.
As a ﬁnal note, I want to say that the purpose of this exercise was to generate
a simple and straightforward model of asymmetric pricing under collusion. The
main strength of my approach is that it provides a basic mechanism of rockets and
feathers that future models can build on. Also, even the simple theoretical frame-
work I used is able to generate several economic implications that can be tested
empirically. By comparing these features with the predictions of other models of
asymmetric pricing, researchers might be able to better distinguish between the
causes of asymmetric pricing in diﬀerent markets. This in turn could improve
policy makers' eﬃciency to reduce the welfare redistribution from consumers to
producers that is associated with asymmetric price adjustment.
Like in any model of real markets, the simplicity of my model comes at a cost.
For example, the assumption that there are only two possible cost states, with
high costs being equal to the reservation price of consumers, is quite unrealistic.
In actual markets, costs can take a continuum of values, with cost shocks being
randomly large. Also, the value of the reservation price ν will usually diﬀer for
individual consumers, implying that demand should be elastic to prices even if
every ﬁrm colluded at the same price. However, I think that the basic intuition
of my model should carry over if one extended it to a continuum of cost states.15
15A possible solution to the resulting coordination problem ﬁrms would have to face when costs
drop might in fact be to assume demand that is price elastic, as this implies some unique
monopoly price given costs.
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More importantly, my model doesn't even try to explain why demand might be
random across periods or why there is exactly a fraction λ of informed consumers
in the market. For more realism, one would have to incorporate consumer search
and thus, the search intensity of consumers (and possibly overall demand) would
become endogenous.
Finally, I think that the model could be improved if one allowed for an interac-
tion between the separated submarkets. If, for example, the measure of poten-
tial consumers in a submarket was somehow negatively related to the number of
submarkets with ﬁerce competition, diﬀerent dynamics for the transmittance of
negative cost shocks could be obtained. Then, prices might begin to adjust slowly,
but as collusion collapses in more and more submarkets, the probability that some
collusive submarket still maintains a demand greater than the minimum threshold
diminishes, as more and more potential consumers leave a submarket.
To sum up, I think that my model might capture some of the eﬀects that drive
asymmetric pricing under oligopolistic coordination. While some of the model's
assumptions are clearly unrealistic and numerous extensions of the model can be
conceived, most of its implications seem plausible and (as can be seen below)
are also shared by other models of asymmetric price transmission. Thus, I think
that my model provides a good starting point for future research in the area of
asymmetric pricing caused by oligopolistic coordination.
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4 Asymmetric Price Adjustment due to Consumer Search
Although policy makers, the media and a fair share of researchers tend to attribute
asymmetric pricing to an abuse of market power and oligopolistic coordination, it
was already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis (see Section 1) that con-
sumer search coupled with asymmetric information drives most contemporaneous
models of rockets and feathers. More precisely, there are at least four formal mod-
els capable of generating asymmetric pricing through imperfect consumer search.16
In this section, I will try to give the reader insight into these theoretical approaches.
Doing so, in Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.2, I will explain the models of Yang
and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) in detail, both providing their rudimentary
mathematical structure and discussing some of their unorthodox aspects as well
as possible extensions. In both subsections covering these models, I will start to
outline the basic mechanism that drives asymmetric pricing in the model, explain
the model's setup and derive equilibrium of the static game. This will be followed
by the derivation of equilibrium of the dynamic game and, for the model of Yang
and Ye, the computation of several comparative statics. A short discussion con-
cludes.
Finally, in Subsection 4.3, I will brieﬂy provide the intuition behind the two other
consumer search models of asymmetric pricing that are currently available. These
were created by Lewis (2009) and Cabral and Fishman (2008). For the sake of
brevity, I will not include any derivations in the discussion of these models.
16Not counting the dynamic oligopoly model I developed in Section 3, I am only aware of two
other formal models that lead to asymmetric pricing. These two models (as well as the idea
of Borenstein et al. (1997) that asymmetric pricing might be the product of ﬁnite inventories
and lags in adjustment of production) will be covered in Section 5.
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4.1 A Model of Consumer Search With Learning
Model Setup and Equilibrium of the Static Game The ﬁrst consumer search
model that leads to asymmetric pricing I will discuss in this thesis was suggested
by Yang and Ye (2008). It is a dynamic model of search with learning. In con-
trast to the traditional opinion that asymmetric pricing is a consequence of market
power (see Section 3), the model shows that there can be a natural tendency to-
wards it even in markets where no collusion is apparent. This tendency is caused
by asymmetric information between ﬁrms and consumers, with the latter being
unable to directly observe the cost realization of ﬁrms.
The basic principle that drives asymmetric pricing in the model is that positive
cost shocks are immediately learned by agents who search, which results in a full
adjustment of the search intensity and prices in the next period. Conversely, non-
searchers need longer to learn the true cost state when a negative cost shock occurs,
which leads to a slower adaption of the search intensity and prices.
The model's setup is as follows. The agents in the model are a continuum of
rational17 consumers and a continuum of ﬁrms (having capacity constraints) pro-
ducing a homogeneous good. All ﬁrms share the same unit cost level, which can
be either high or low and is unobserved by consumers. There are three types of
consumers: consumers who always search (low search costs), consumers who never
search (high search costs), and, most importantly, critical consumers (intermedi-
ate search cost) that endogenously determine whether they search or not. Like
in other search models, these consumers will search when the expected beneﬁt of
search (in terms of expected price reduction) exceeds their search costs.
17In the sense that they optimally process all the information available to them.
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Nonsearchers will shop randomly and buy from the ﬁrst ﬁrm they encounter (given
there is no binding capacity constraint for the ﬁrm), while searchers will observe
the price quotations of all ﬁrms and buy at the ﬁrm with the lowest price (again
given that this ﬁrm is not capacity constrained).18 That is, the protocol of nonse-
quential search is adopted.
Formally, the total measure of ﬁrms is normalized to one, with each ﬁrm having
a (marginal) cost realization of either cL or cH , with cL < cH . Firms observe this
realization at the beginning of the static game and then compete in prices. Also
ﬁrms have a capacity constraint in the sense that each ﬁrm can sell k < ∞ units
of the good at most.
The continuum of consumers is normalized to a total measure of β, with β > 1.
β can thus be interpreted as the number of consumers per ﬁrm in the market.
Consumers have a unit demand with a reservation price equal to ν > cH . It is
also assumed that β < k, which implies that the number of consumers per ﬁrm in
the market is smaller than the capacity constraint (i.e., overall, there are enough
goods for each consumer). Consumers cannot observe the true cost realization of
ﬁrms, but have certain beliefs. Let α denote the probability a consumer assigns
to the realization of the high cost level, cH .
The type of each consumer is fully characterized by his or her search cost. A
fraction λ1 of consumers has zero search cost sL = 0; these consumers are named
18The capacity constraint of ﬁrms that is part of the model can result in rationing among
consumers, i.e., it can happen that low-price ﬁrms attract too many customers. In this case,
it is assumed that each customer is served with equal probability. If a nonsearcher is rationed,
they will randomly shop at another ﬁrm (without additional cost). If a shopper is rationed,
they will go to the ﬁrm with the lowest price of all remaining ﬁrms (and so on, if they are
rationed again).
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shoppers. Each shopper will search in equilibrium, no matter what their beliefs α
are. A fraction λ2 of consumers is assumed to have a search cost sH > ν, implying
that it will never search in equilibrium. The remaining 1−λ1−λ2 consumers have
intermediate search cost sM ∈ (sL, sH). Their decision whether to search or not is
endogenously determined and depends on their beliefs about the cost state α. As
mentioned above, they are referred to as critical consumers.
As the critical consumers are the only consumers that have an endogenous search
decision, I will denote the cumulative distribution function of critical consumers'
beliefs by F (α), with F (α) being the fraction of critical consumers believing
Pr(c = cH) ≤ α.
The stage game will have the following timeline. After observing production costs,
ﬁrms simultaneously set their prices. Then, the critical consumers make their
search decision based on their beliefs, while all of the shoppers search for sure
and all the nonshoppers don't. The game is complete after the buying process of
consumers is ﬁnished.
The focus of the analysis will be laid on symmetric equilibria, which means that
each ﬁrm has to use the same pricing strategy, following a price distribution G. If
one denotes the endogenously determined µ ≥ λ1 as the proportion of consumers
who search (shoppers plus critical consumers that search), a symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the game can be characterized by a combination of µ∗ and
G∗(.|c) such that given the equilibrium search intensity µ∗ and their cost level,
ﬁrms' optimal pricing strategies yield the price distribution G∗(.|c), while given
G∗(.|c) and the consumers' beliefs F (α), consumer's optimal search decisions lead
to a search intensity of µ∗.
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As a starting point, the analysis of the game is carried out with a ﬁxed (exogenous)
search intensity µ. Let p be the lowest price in the support of the equilibrium price
distribution, and η(p) be the proportion of ﬁrms charging this price. Then a ﬁrm
charging p will make sales of
µβ
η(p)
+ (1− µ)β (4.1)
if this number is smaller than it's capacity constraint k, or sales of k if not.19
The authors prove that there are several direct implications of the above result.20
First, they show that ﬁrms charging pmust always sell k units in every equilibrium,
and that they are not rationed while doing so. Formally, it must thus hold that
each low price ﬁrm gets exactly a demand of k in equilibrium, i.e., it holds that
µβ
η(p)
+ (1− µ)β = k. (4.2)
19The most natural way to understand Equation (4.1) is by thinking in discrete terms. If the
total number of consumers is denoted by nc, the total number of ﬁrms is denoted by nf
and there are nf (p) ﬁrms charging a price of p, the number of searchers shopping at some
random ﬁrm that prices p would clearly be µ ncnf (p) .
By expanding the numerator and denominator of this ratio by 1nf and using that
nc
nf
= β
as well as
nf (p)
nf
= η(p), one can see that
µ
nc
nf
nf (p)
nf
=
µβ
η(p)
,
which is the ﬁrst term of Equation (4.1).
Also, a ﬁrm pricing p can expect to attract (1−µ)ncnf nonsearching consumers by chance.
Using again that ncnf = β, the second term of Equation (4.1) becomes clear.
20For a rigorous proof, see Yang and Ye (2008, p. 552f)
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Also, it can be shown that no equilibrium exists such that prices are continuously
distributed over [p, p] if p ≤ ν. From this the most important property can be
derived, namely that
Lemma 1. The price distribution has two mass points. Given µ and c, each ﬁrm
must either charge p = ν or p = p ∈ (c, ν) in equilibrium.
Because ﬁrms can only choose between pricing at ν and pricing at p, the ﬁnal step
to obtain an equilibrium of the static game when the search intensity µ is exogenous
is to equate the proﬁts of ﬁrms charging these two prices, as both types of ﬁrms
have to make the same proﬁt in equilibrium. As mentioned above, a low price ﬁrm
will sell k units and thus make a proﬁt of pi(p) = k(p− c). A high price ﬁrm will
face a demand of (1− µ)β and hence make a proﬁt of pi(ν) = (1− µ)β(ν − c).
Equilibrium is then deﬁned by Equation (4.2) and
pi(ν) = pi(p). (4.3)
Rearranging equations (4.2) and (4.3), it directly follows that
η(p) =
µβ
k − β + µβ (4.4)
and
p = c+
(1− µ)β
k
(ν − c). (4.5)
It can easily be proven that the price distribution from above (a fraction η(p) of
the ﬁrms pricing p and the remaining ﬁrms pricing ν) is in fact an equilibrium
of the static game, given an exogenously determined µ, some cost level c and the
parameters β, k and ν. To do so, one can simply show that it makes no sense to
deviate for any ﬁrm pricing ν or p.
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It is worth noting that all the properties of the above equilibrium make sense.
η(p) is an increasing function with µ, implying that a higher search intensity will
lead more ﬁrms to price low. Also, the low price p is decreasing with µ. The
interpretation for this is that when more consumers decide to search, the overall
elasticity of demand will increase, making it proﬁtable for some high price ﬁrms
to deviate. Low price ﬁrms will (cet. par.) attract more consumers, implying that
their proﬁt margin p− c must become smaller (by a reduction of p) to keep them
indiﬀerent between pricing at p and ν.
It can also be seen that the cost level c has no inﬂuence on the ratio of low and
high price sellers, but only on the level of the low price.
Having determined the equilibrium of the static game when the search intensity
is exogenous, it is ﬁnally necessary to endogenize this variable in order to derive
a true equilibrium of the stage game. For this, it is assumed that ﬁrms know the
distribution of consumers' beliefs F (α), while consumers may or may not know it.
Then, it is possible to determine the expected price reduction for a consumer with
belief α, i.e., who beliefs that Pr(c = cH) = α and Pr(c = cL) = 1− α. Doing so,
the authors show that the expected price reduction by search is not inﬂuenced by
the search intensity µ, which means that the gains from search are independent
from the search level. It also becomes apparent that the expected gain from
search is decreasing with a consumer's belief α. This is quite an intuitive result
and shows that consumers with a pessimistic belief (i.e., high α) expect to have
lower gains from search (compared to more optimistic consumers). It also follows
that there must be a cutoﬀ belief αˆ which divides the group of critical consumers
into searchers and nonsearchers. αˆ can simply calculated by equating the search
costs of the critical consumers sM with their expected gains from search, which
results in
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αˆ =
(ν − cL)(k − β)− ksM
(cH − cL)(k − β) . (4.6)
From this, it is only a small step to calculate the equilibrium search intensity µ∗.
As F (α) is deﬁned as the fraction of consumers that have beliefs of α or less (with
less being more optimistic), it follows that a fraction F (αˆ) of the critical consumers
will search. Combined with the fraction λ1 of consumers that will search anyway,
the equilibrium search intensity µ∗ can be written as
µ∗ = λ1 + (1− λ1 − λ2)F (αˆ). (4.7)
The authors show that both αˆ and µ∗ are unique, which gives rise to a unique equi-
librium. This unique equilibrium of the static game is deﬁned by equations (4.4),
(4.5), (4.6) and (4.7). Given F (α) and the parameters of the model, consumers'
optimal decisions lead to an equilibrium search intensity of µ∗. Firms anticipate
that and price accordingly, following the distribution derived earlier. No rationing
occurs in equilibrium.
To ﬁnish the analysis of the static game, it is useful to look at some attributes
and comparative statics of the equilibrium. The ﬁrst thing one can see is that the
average price paid by customers will be lower under low costs. This is because the
low price p
L
under low costs (when c = cL) is lower than the low price pH under
high costs (when c = cH), while the high price ν and the fraction of low and high
price ﬁrms is the same in both states. It can also be shown21 that prices are more
dispersed (as measured by the diﬀerence of the average price to the lowest price)
21see Yang and Ye (2008, p. 554)
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under the low cost state, making search more rewarding under this state (although
consumers don't know in which state they are, of course).
Also, as F (αˆ) is increasing in αˆ, a higher cutoﬀ level for critical consumers αˆ will
imply a higher search intensity µ∗. From this it follows that p
H
and p
L
are both
decreasing in F (αˆ) (as p is decreasing in µ). Furthermore η(p) is increasing in
F (αˆ) too because η(p) is increasing in µ. Finally it can be proven that the average
price paid by consumers is decreasing in µ and increasing in F (αˆ). This concludes
the analysis of the static game.
Equilibrium of the Dynamic Game and Comparative Statics Now, the static
game as described above will be extended to a dynamic framework. For this, I
consider the static game played repeatedly over time. Time is modeled as discrete,
i.e., t = 1, 2, ..., and will be denoted by a subscript.
The ﬁrst thing necessary to model the dynamic game is to describe how costs will
evolve over time. Like in the dynamic oligopoly model of Section 3, it is assumed
that
Pr(ct+1 = cH |ct = cH) = Pr(ct+1 = cL|ct = cL) = ρ > 0.5, (4.8)
i.e., that there is some persistence parameter ρ > 0.5 that deﬁnes the probability
of observing the same cost state in t + 1 as in t. For the ﬁrst period (t = 1), it
is assumed that Pr(c1 = cH) = Pr(c1 = cL) = 0.5, that is both states are equally
likely at t = 1. Also, Equation (4.8) and the probabilities for the ﬁrst period are
considered common knowledge.
It is further assumed that ﬁrms always know the current and past cost levels
whereas consumers can only update their beliefs based on the prices they observe.
Consumers do not get to know the past cost realizations, although they are some-
times able to exactly determine them from the price distribution. The assumption
that consumers do not eventually ﬁnd out past cost realizations is a very essential
53
one for the model. Only because of this, there can be a gradual learning process
among consumers that will lead to asymmetric price adjustment. In the next sec-
tion, a model of Tappata (2009) will be discussed that doesn't incorporate learning
and hence explains asymmetric price adjustment in a diﬀerent fashion.
Next, it is important to recapitulate that the price distribution of the static game
was dependent on consumers' beliefs and the cost realization. In particular, one
could see that p was dependent on the cost level c, and it could be shown that
p
H
> p
L
holds for any search intensity µ. The dynamic setting can now use this
feature to explain a delayed response to negative input price changes.
To do this, it is helpful to make some parameter restrictions that greatly reduce
the complexity of the problem ﬁrst. The parameters are assumed to be such22
that the lowest possible price under high costs, i.e., p
H
when all critical consumers
search, will still be higher than the highest possible price under low costs, i.e., p
L
when none of the critical consumers search (recall that p is negatively related to µ).
This can also be called the nonoverlapping condition, meaning that the supports
of p
H
and p
L
(whose ranges are determined by µ) do not overlap.
The simple conclusion to this is that a price observation of p directly tells a con-
sumer in which cost regime they are. Using Equation (4.8), such a consumer can
immediately calculate the correct probabilities for the cost states in the next pe-
riod.23 In contrast, a (nonsearching) consumer that observes the high price ν will
not be able to infer anything from this observation because ν is the high price in
each cost regime and the fraction of ﬁrms charging ν, 1− η(p), doesn't depend on
22See Yang and Ye (2008, p. 555)
23Their belief αt+1 = Pr(ct+1 = cH) will be ρ if they observe pH and 1− ρ if they observe pL.
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c either. This can also easily be proven formally by applying Bayes' rule.
As no new information for a nonsearching consumer becomes available if they
observe p = ν, their beliefs update according to
αt+1 = ραt + (1− ρ)(1− αt). (4.9)
A consumer with initial belief ρ who observes ν in each subsequent period will
thus have beliefs converging to 1/2 from above, that is αt+k = 1/2 for k → ∞
according to Equation (4.9).
This yields another parameter restriction that is needed to derive equilibrium. It
is assumed that αˆ will be such that, on the one hand, consumers with the most
optimistic belief 1− ρ will always search, and on the other hand, that consumers
with the most pessimistic initial belief of ρ will never search if they observe a price
of ν in every period that follows. This condition boils down to αˆ ∈ (1 − ρ, 1/2).
Another interpretation of αˆ < 1/2 is that critical consumers will never search if
they believe that the high cost state is more likely than the low cost one.
Now how does asymmetric pricing emerge in the dynamic setting? First of all, a
benchmark for prices can be deﬁned. In a given period, the average price (and
lowest price p) will be lowest when the cost level is low (ct = cL) and all of the
critical consumers search, i.e., µ∗t = µ = 1 − λ2. Analogously, the average price
(and lowest price p) will be highest when the cost level is high (ct = cH) and none
of the critical consumers search, i.e., µ∗t = µ = λ1. Restricting the model param-
eters in a way that the search cost sM of critical consumers is such that there
must always be a positive fraction of critical consumers that does (not) search if
α ∈ (0, 1), consumers will have full knowledge about the cost regime they live in
if the search intensity is µ or µ, as otherwise there would be heterogeneity among
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critical consumers. Because of this, it is possible to deﬁne full price adjustment
under both cost states. Prices will have fully adjusted if it holds that µ∗t = 1− λ2
under cL or µ∗t = λ1 under cH .
From this, it can be seen why there will be asymmetries in price adjustment. First,
consider the case were high costs persist from period t onwards, i.e., having a cost
realization of cH for t, t+ 1, t+ 2, ....
In period t, the fraction Ft(αˆ) of consumers that have beliefs αt < αˆ will search
and observe the price p
H
. Thus they can immediately infer in which cost state
they are (leading to an immediate partial price adjustment if costs were diﬀerent
before), and their initial beliefs for period t+1 will become ρ > 1/2 > αˆ according
to the assumption made above that αˆ < 1/2.
The fraction 1− Ft(αˆ) of critical consumers that do not search in t will consist of
consumers that happen to observe the low price p
H
by chance (which is a fraction
ηt(pH) of nonsearching critical consumers) and consumers that only observe the
high price ν. The nonsearching critical consumers that observe the low price can
also immediately infer in which state they are (again leading to an immediate
partial price adjustment in case of a cost regime change) and will adapt their
beliefs for t + 1 to ρ > αˆ, just like the searching critical consumers. Solely the
nonsearching critical consumers that observe ν cannot immediately infer in which
state they are (averting full price adjustment in t if costs have changed) and also
cannot correctly adapt their beliefs for t + 1. Thus they will update their beliefs
following 4.9, with αt+1 ∈ [1/2, ρ] as Equation (4.9) is approaching 1/2 from above.
Combining these observations, one can see that every critical consumer will have
beliefs αt+1 > 1/2 > αˆ in t+ 1, implying that
Ft+1(αˆ) = 0 if ct = cH . (4.10)
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Overall, a positive cost shock in period t will only have a partial price adjustment
eﬀect in period t (as some fraction of nonsearching critical consumers is unable to
infer the true cost state in t), but will induce a full adjustment of prices in period
t+1 because the search intensity µ will drop to µ within one period as of Equation
(4.10). However, this only holds if the cost remains high in period t + 1, as only
in this case beliefs and prices will not be aﬀected by a chance observation of p
L
by
some nonsearching critical consumers in t+ 1.
In contrast, examine the case where a negative cost shock happens at period t,
changing costs from cH in period t−1 to cL in periods t, t+1, t+2, .... Like above,
critical consumers in period t will be split into three subgroups. Those with a
belief of αt < αˆ will search, observe pL, directly infer the true cost state from
it and cause an immediate eﬀect on prices. Their beliefs for t + 1 will update to
αt+1 = 1−ρ < 1/2. The same happens for the fraction ηt(pL) of critical consumers
that do not search but observe the low price p
L
by chance. The remaining 1−ηt(pL)
nonsearching critical consumers that observe ν cannot infer new information about
the current state (which results in no immediate eﬀect on prices) and will adapt
their beliefs for t+1 according to 4.9, with αt+1 remaining in [1/2, ρ]. As 1−ρ < αˆ,
the former two subgroups will search in period t+1, while the latter subgroup will
not. That is, Ft+1(αˆ) = Ft(αˆ) + ηt(pL)[1− Ft(αˆ)] or
Ft+1(αˆ) = Ft(αˆ) +
µ∗tβ
k − β + µ∗tβ
[1− Ft(αˆ)]. (4.11)
As it is assumed that there is an initial cost shock (costs are high in t − 1), it
follows from using 4.1024 for t = t− 1 (i.e., Ft(αˆ) = 0 and µ∗t = µ) that
Ft+1(αˆ) =
µβ
k − β + µβ < 1 if ct = cL, ct−1 = cH . (4.12)
24Recall that (4.10) doesn't depend on an initial cost shock to apply.
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The above ratio is smaller than unity, implying that consumers' beliefs do not
update as quickly (i.e., within one period) when there is a negative cost shock as
when there is a positive one. Full price adjustment would only be reached if it
held that Ft+1(αˆ) = 1, which means that every critical consumer would search in
t + 1, i.e., it would have to hold that µ∗t+1 = µ. Furthermore, even if the low cost
state persists, there will always be some fraction of consumers that has not yet
observed the low price p
L
. It can be shown via Equation (4.11) that a negative
cost shock in period t which persists forever would need inﬁnitely many periods to
ﬁnally result in F (αˆ) = 1, i.e., µ = µ, resulting in full price adjustment.
It can also be seen that the magnitude of asymmetry in the ﬁrst period after a
cost shock will be quite large. As a full adjustment after a cost decrease implies
that Ft+1(αˆ) =
µβ
k−β+µβ should be equal to 1, the amount of adjustment will be
small if µ is small (or k − β is large). The former is true when the fraction of
consumers with very low search costs (who always search) is small, which seems
to be a plausible assumption.
In summary, the model predicts a full adjustment of the search intensity (and
hence, prices) to a positive cost shock within two periods, whereas a negative cost
shock is predicted to induce a long adjustment period, with only a gradual increase
in the search intensity and a gradual decrease in prices. The intuition behind this
is that positive cost shocks are immediately learned by critical consumers who
search, which directly inﬂuences their beliefs for the next period, making them
nonsearchers. Critical consumers who do not already search either observe p
H
,
infer from this that they are in the high cost state and stop searching as well, or
observe ν and update their beliefs such that they stay nonsearchers in the next
period. Thus none of the critical consumers will search in t+1. On the contrary, a
negative cost shock can never have the eﬀect that every critical consumer searches
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in the next period because those critical consumers who do not search in t and
that do not happen to observe p
L
in this period will keep nonsearching in t + 1,
as their beliefs only converge to 1/2 > αˆ from above. In each subsequent period,
some residual fraction of nonsearching critical consumers will never have observed
p
L
so far and will remain nonsearching in the period that follows. This is why
there will only be a gradual increase in search intensity and slow decline in prices,
compared to a positive cost shock.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is an inﬁnite number of possible equilibrium
paths, generated by diﬀerent cost evolutions {ct}. All of those would be character-
ized by diﬀerent degrees of asymmetry, depending on how the cost states change.
But it is not surprising that when examining the expected evolution path, adjust-
ment asymmetry is obvious. This is because in expectation, each cost state (H
or L) will last for some constant number of periods, say N .25 The expected cost
evolution will thus look like
LL...︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
HH...︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
LL...︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
... .
Following the argumentation from above, it is evident that the lowest price will
be reached in the Nth period of state L, while the highest price will already be
reached in the second period of state H. The larger the value of N is (implying
a higher ρ), the more adjustment asymmetry will be present in the economy, on
average.
In other words, the comparative statics for the persistence parameter ρ are such
that a higher persistence of costs will lead to a more pronounced adjustment asym-
25The expected duration of one cost regime will be ρ+ ρ2 + ρ3 + . . . = 11−ρ > 2.
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metry of prices to cost shocks, at least on the expected evolution path of costs.
More intuitively, this can be seen by deﬁning the amount of asymmetry as the
ratio of absolute price adjustments within one period after a negative and positive
price shock (adjustment ratio). Then, it can be shown that this adjustment ratio
will be smaller (implying more severe rockets and feathers) if ρ increases. The
reason for this is that a larger ρ implies a longer expected duration of some cost
state, resulting in a lower minimum price after an expected N periods of low costs.
Then, the change in average prices after a positive cost shock will be larger, as
positive cost shocks lead to a full adaption of prices after one period. On the other
hand, the speed with which average prices fall after a negative cost shock does
not depend on ρ. Overall, this means that the adjustment ratio will be smaller
for large ρ, as the adjustment to positive cost shocks (which is in the denominator
of the adjustment ratio) increases, while the adjustment to negative cost shocks
(which is in the nominator of the adjustment ratio) stays the same.
A nice feature of this property is that it can be tested empirically. In markets where
costs do not tend to ﬂuctuate much, price adjustment should be more asymmetric
than in markets with very instable input costs. Also, as this result was already
obtained by the trigger sales model provided in Section 3, the property that asym-
metric pricing should be more severe under a high persistence of costs gets further
support.
The next parameter with interesting comparative statics is the fraction of shoppers
λ1. It can be shown that a smaller fraction of shoppers implies a longer adjust-
ment process to negative cost shocks. I will again leave out a formal proof as
the intuition behind this is quite striking. When a negative cost shock occurs in
some period t and persists afterwards, a smaller λ1 directly implies that a smaller
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fraction of consumers searches in each period, which leads to a slower adjustment
of beliefs and prices in t and every period that follows. On the contrary, a pos-
itive cost shock will be learned by every critical consumer after one period, just
as with a higher λ1. Overall this leads to a higher degree of adjustment asymmetry.
Interestingly, this feature of the model is the exact opposite of the result obtained
in the oligopolistic coordination model I provided in Section 3, where a higher
fraction of shoppers in any submarket implied a higher likelihood of asymmet-
ric pricing among ﬁrms. The fraction of shoppers λ can thus be considered as
benchmark to test which model yields the better predictions: if a high fraction
of informed consumers does in fact decrease the chance of asymmetric pricing in
many markets, a trigger sales model in the form I provided would turn out to be
an improper explanation for such a behavior.
Finally one can derive that an increase in the capacity of ﬁrms k compared to
the measure of consumers β will also lead to a slower adjustment to negative cost
shocks. The reason for this is that a smaller k/β will lead less ﬁrms to set the
low price p.26 Hence in each period after a negative cost shock, fewer critical
consumers (that do not search) will learn that they are in the low cost state by
chance, resulting in a slower adjustment of beliefs and prices.
Discussion Like in any other economic model, the authors had to make simpli-
fying assumptions. Probably the most unorthodox assumption of the model is that
26To see this, recall Equation (4.4) of the static model. As
∂η(p)
∂k =
−µβ
(k−β+µβ)2 < 0, fewer ﬁrms
will set the low price p if k gets bigger compared to β.
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there is not a discrete set of ﬁrms, but a continuum with measure one. The reason
for this is mostly a technical one, i.e., it avoids having to deal with randomness
and makes the derivation of equilibrium easier. I agree with the authors that the
implications should be no diﬀerent to a discrete model with, say, n = 1000 ﬁrms.
However, as the number of ﬁrms reaches a level were collusion becomes possible
(perhaps ten or less ﬁrms), I think the results will probably be inadequate and the
model proposed in Section 3 might yield better predictions. But as the point of
the model was not the description of behavior in an oligopolistic framework, this
is just a minor point of consideration.
Another implication of the assumed continuum of ﬁrms is that searchers (who
are able to observe every price quotation made by ﬁrms) eﬀectively get to know
inﬁnitely many prices in each period. This seems to be quite an implausible prop-
erty. To its defense, the authors show that there would be no explicit equilibrium
solution for the case where each searching consumer only observes n > 1 prices
(which would be a more realistic scenario).
Also I think that they are right in their view that the basic features of the model
should carry over to a model with a ﬁnite number of observed price quotations
in each period. The reason for this is that the key mechanism that drives price
adjustment asymmetry in the model is that nonsearchers only observe one price
quotation per period and can thus only slowly update their beliefs in case of a
negative cost shock. In contrast, even if searching consumers only observe n in-
stead of inﬁnitely many price quotations, they will be able to update their beliefs
much quicker than nonsearching consumers if a negative cost shock has happened.
In fact, with a fraction η(p) of ﬁrms charging the low price, the probability of ob-
serving at least one low price p when observing n random prices is 1− [1− η(p)]n.
This value quickly converges to one for increasing n.
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The last unconventional assumption is that each ﬁrm has a capacity constraint of
exactly k units. While it is probably true that there are some (possibly pretty
loose) constraints in most retail markets, the model implies that these constraints
play a crucial role for reaching equilibrium, which is, in my opinion, a bit far-
fetched.27 The authors address part of this defect by relaxing the model assump-
tions to allow for two diﬀerent capacity constraints k1 and k2. They can show that
a two-point distribution of prices will also emerge in this case and that asymmetric
pricing is robust to heterogeneous capacity constraints (at least for two diﬀerent
constraints).
Overall, none of the assumptions of the model seem to be indefensible, although
the property of binding capacity constraints for each ﬁrm that sets the low price
p seems to be quite unrealistic. Also it has to be emphasized that Yang & Ye's
model only addresses the case of markets with a large number of competing ﬁrms.
Once collusion gets more probable and the number of ﬁrms decreases, the model's
implications might become inaccurate.
As a ﬁnal remark, it has to be said that the authors are among the ﬁrst who
provide a theoretical explanation of why asymmetric price adjustment might nat-
urally emerge in competitive markets. If some of their predictions can be veriﬁed
empirically, their contribution should have a large impact on contemporary eco-
nomic theory, especially the theory on consumer search and optimal pricing under
competition.
27E.g. a big gasoline retailer will usually not have a binding capacity constraint.
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4.2 A Model of Consumer Search Without Learning
Model Setup and Equilibrium of the Static Game In this subsection, I will
present a model suggested by Tappata (2009) that explains asymmetric price ad-
justment but doesn't rely on a learning process to derive this asymmetry. In some
way, Tappata's model can thus be considered as a more elemental version of Yang
& Ye's work. The price for this is that a gradual adaption of prices cannot be
modeled, meaning that prices always fully adjust within two periods.
Tappata uses a model based on nonsequential consumer search in a competitive
market with rational agents to explain asymmetric price adjustment by ﬁrms to
random cost shocks. In order to do so, the author points out that the demand
elasticities of consumers must be a function of previous cost realizations.28 If this
was not the case, ﬁrms would have no incentive to diﬀerentiate between positive
and negative cost shocks when determining their optimal output prices. Even in
the case of imperfectly informed consumers with positive search costs, the result-
ing equilibrium price dispersion (see Varian, 1980) will result in a new optimal
markup that doesn't discriminate between positive and negative cost shocks.
So what is the key mechanism that drives asymmetry in Tappata's model? Like
in many prominent search models, ﬁrms choose some optimal price distribution
G∗(.|µ, c) that is dependent on the search intensity µ of consumers and the ﬁrms'
cost level c. Similar to Varian's model, ﬁrms will choose less dispersed prices
under high than under low costs because their pricing range, i.e., the diﬀerence
between marginal costs and the monopoly price, gets smaller under high costs. As
28Or, as in Yang and Ye (2008), beliefs about previous cost realizations.
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consumers are rational, they adapt to this behavior by searching less when they
expect prices to be high.
Here comes another feature into play that was already used in Yang & Ye's model,
namely that cost shocks can be time dependent. Again, this means that there can
be some persistence parameter ρ > 1/2 that deﬁnes the likelihood of some cost
state carrying over to the next period. So if ρ > 1/2 (and consumers know this),
search will be low if the previous period's costs were high and high when the pre-
vious period's costs were low. This is exactly what constitutes demand elasticities
that are dependent on previous cost realizations, but not current ones.
An unexpected change from low to high costs will thus lead ﬁrms to quickly in-
crease their prices because consumers will search a lot. In contrast, a change from
high to low costs will have a smaller eﬀect because less consumers will search.
Overall this implies asymmetric price adjustment to costs.
Having outlined the intuition behind Tappata's model, it is time to brieﬂy describe
the model setup in the static framework. The industry constitutes of n = 2 ﬁrms
that sell a homogeneous good and compete through prices. At the beginning, both
ﬁrms are randomly assigned either low (c = cL) or high (c = cH) production costs,
with the probability of both ﬁrms having costs of cH being α and both ﬁrms having
costs of cL being 1− α.
While the model can be fully extended to n > 2 ﬁrms in the market, with most of
its predictions being robust to the introduction of a multitude of ﬁrms, I will not
discuss the model for the case where n > 2. However, I will brieﬂy point out some
of its implications for increased n in the concluding discussion.
But no matter what n is, the ﬁrst crucial diﬀerence to Yang & Ye's model becomes
apparent. Instead of a continuum of ﬁrms (that creates issues like inﬁnitely many
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price observations per searcher), there is only a ﬁnite (and possibly small) number
of ﬁrms in the market.
Like in most search models, there is a continuum of consumers (this time with
measure one) having a unit demand and a reservation price ν. Before consumers
buy, they decide whether to search or not by the protocol of nonsequential search.
If they search, they get to know all (i.e., for n = 2, both) prices set by the ﬁrms
and shop at the ﬁrm with the lowest price. If they do not search, they shop at a
random ﬁrm.
Again, some fraction λ of consumers called shoppers has zero search cost, while
all other (i.e., 1 − λ) consumers are called nonshoppers and have positive search
costs drawn from a continuous distribution, with si ∈ S = [0, s]. H(s) denotes the
fraction of nonshoppers that have search costs smaller than s.29
Depending on the expectation of consumers about the ﬁrms' cost level and the
resulting price dispersion, only those nonshoppers will search that have search
costs lower than the expected gains from search, resulting in some search intensity
µ. At the same time, ﬁrms anticipate this search intensity and maximize their
proﬁts by setting prices accordingly. Equilibrium can thus again be characterized
by some equilibrium search intensity µ∗ and an equilibrium distribution of prices
G∗(.|µ∗, c).
From the above assumptions, it is easy to calculate the proﬁt of a ﬁrm charging
pj, facing a search intensity of µ, costs of c and the price of the other ﬁrm p−j. It
holds that
pij(pj, p−j; c;µ) = (pj − c)[1 + µ
2
I{pj<p−j} +
1
2
I{pj=p−j} +
1− µ
2
I{pj>p−j}] (4.13)
29This distribution of search costs is assumed to be public knowledge.
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with I{X} = 1 if X is true, and 0 if not. For example, if pj < p−j, it follows
that pij(pj, p−j; c;µ) = (pj − c)(1+µ2 ) = (pj − c)(µ + 1−µ2 ), i.e., the full measure of
shoppers and half of the measure of nonshoppers is served for the price of pj.
Then, the utility of some consumer i can be deﬁned as the diﬀerence of their
reservation price ν to the expected price they have to pay (including search costs
in case they search).
To solve for a (symmetric) Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the ﬁrms' pricing
strategy G(.|c) is a best response to the consumers' search decision µ and the
consumers' search decision is a best response to the ﬁrm's pricing decision, it is
useful to start with the proﬁt function of ﬁrms. Using an undercutting argument
similar to the one provided in Subsection 3.2 and Varian (1980), one can show that
that there can be no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies if 0 < µ < 1.
Solving for a mixed strategy equilibrium where both ﬁrms price according to some
probability distribution F (p), one can show that
F (p) = 1− 1− µ
2µ
(
ν − p
p− c
)
(4.14)
for any p in a range of [p, ν], with
p = c+
(
1− µ
1 + µ
)
(ν − c). (4.15)
For a proof that (4.14) and (4.15) do in fact constitute a unique Nash Best Re-
sponse to µ, see Varian (1980).
It can easily be seen that p is negatively related to the search intensity µ, i.e.,
ﬁrms' pricing range increases when consumers search more. The reason for this is
that more informed consumers imply smaller proﬁts for ﬁrms, extending the range
of prices that ﬁrms can charge while remaining indiﬀerent between them.
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Also, it can be seen that F (p, µ′; c) is bigger than F (p, µ; c) for every µ′ > µ. That
is, the probability of observing some price smaller than p is always larger for higher
search intensities µ′ > µ. This can be explained by the fact that higher search
intensities make it more proﬁtable for ﬁrms to try to steal informed consumers
from their competition by charging the lowest price in the market.
Next, the search decision of individuals (who are not capable of inﬂuencing µ
because there are inﬁnitely many consumers) will be examined. Given ﬁrms' best
response to some search intensity µ that was derived above, a consumer's expected
beneﬁt from search is their expected price reduction given µ, i.e., E[p − pmin|µ].
Tappata shows that
E[p− pmin|µ] = (ν − E[c])1− µ
2µ2
[
log
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
− 2µ
]
(4.16)
with E[c] = αcH + (1− α)cL.
The above expression can also be interpreted as price dispersion. The higher this
dispersion gets, the more consumers will decide to search (given the distribution of
search costs H(s)) because more and more consumers will have an expected ben-
eﬁt from search that exceeds their search costs. According to Tappata, Equation
(4.16) can be shown to have an interior maximum at some point µˆ with 0 < µˆ < 1,
meaning that beyond some optimal search intensity, the expected beneﬁt of search
begins to diminish.
Like in other search models, a consumer will decide to search when the beneﬁts of
search exceed their search cost. It is clear that the fraction λ of consumers with
zero search cost (shoppers) will always search. In contrast, consumers with search
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cost greater than ν − p∗ will never search, as their search cost will always exceed
their beneﬁts from search. That is, a fraction (1− λ)(1−H(ν − p∗)) will strictly
prefer to shop at a random ﬁrm in equilibrium.
The search costs of an indiﬀerent consumer s˜ must be equal to their expected
beneﬁts from search, i.e., their net beneﬁt from search must be zero. That is,
s˜ = (ν − E[c])1− µ
2µ2
[
log
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
− 2µ
]
(4.17)
Having deﬁned s˜, every consumer with search costs less than s˜ will search, while
every consumer with higher search costs will not. To be precise, it must hold that
µ = λ+ (1− λ)H(s˜). (4.18)
By combining equations (4.17) and (4.18), an equilibrium solution for s˜ and µ can
be found. This market equilibrium depends on the number of shoppers λ, the
distribution of search costs H(s) and the parameters that inﬂuence the gains from
search. One problem is that it doesn't have to be unique, meaning that there can
be multiple s˜ and µ where a marginal consumer is indiﬀerent between searching
and not. However, it can be shown that the equilibrium must be unique if λ > µˆ.30
One example for a unique equilibrium can be seen in Figure 4.1. Here, search costs
(si ∈ [0, s]) are assumed to be uniformly distributed among nonshoppers, implying
that some marginal nonshopping consumer that has not yet searched will have
search costs of (µ− λ) s
1−λ when µ consumers have already decided to search. The
equilibrium levels of µ and s˜ can easily be determined by the intersection of the
gains from search and search cost lines. The blue curve depicts the expected gains
from search under higher expected costs, i.e., higher α.
30For another parameter condition that implies unique equilibria, see Tappata (2009, p. 679).
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Figure 4.1 Example for a unique equilibrium in Tappata's model. Source: Modiﬁcation of
Tappata (2009, p. 679)
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As we see, equilibrium constitutes of some optimal search intensity µ∗ that is a
best response to ﬁrms' expected price dispersion and an optimal price dispersion
E[p − pmin|µ∗] that is a best response to this optimal search intensity µ∗. The
higher the equilibrium search intensity, the more dispersed prices are.
Recalling Equation (4.15), it is important to recognize that the range of prices
ﬁrms will choose from is smaller with high production costs c. As a result, the
price dispersion (and thus, beneﬁts from search) are smaller under high production
costs, implying that consumers who expect costs to be high will search less.31
Because the expectation of consumers can be wrong and ﬁrms have an informa-
tional advantage over them by getting to know the true production costs without
delay, ﬁrms' optimal response to cost shocks will be diﬀerent for positive and neg-
ative shocks. As mentioned earlier, a sudden change from low to high production
costs in period t will result in a `too high' search intensity of consumers in period
t + 1 (compared to if they knew in which cost state they are), leading ﬁrms to
increase prices more than it would be optimal under perfect information. In con-
trast, a sudden dump in production costs has the eﬀect that `too few' consumers
will search in the next period, implying that ﬁrms' optimal strategy is to reduce
prices less than it would be optimal in a world with perfect information. This
is exactly the mechanism that drives asymmetric pricing in Tappata's model. In
what follows, I will derive this asymmetry for the dynamic game.
31This can be seen by considering Equation (4.16) for increasing α. As the gains from search get
smaller for each search intensity µ if E[c] increases, the search costs of the indiﬀerent consumer
s˜ are smaller for high α, implying less search intensity µ under pessimistic consumers. This
can also be seen graphically by considering the blue curve in Figure 4.1.
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Equilibrium of the Dynamic Game Here, I will proceed to extend the static
version of Tappata's model to a dynamic framework and show that asymmetric
price adjustment does emerge if production costs are persistent, i.e., cost shocks
are not independent and identically distributed. In order to do so, the static game
is repeated over time, with t = 1, 2, .... At the beginning of each period, nature
assigns high production costs with probability α and low production costs with
probability 1−α to both ﬁrms. Then, consumers get to know the previous period's
cost realization and can update their beliefs accordingly. Finally ﬁrms maximize
their utility by choosing some price distribution that maximizes their proﬁts, while
anticipating the search decision of consumers.
It is clear that in this setup, prices can change because of two reasons. First of all,
ﬁrms will adapt their pricing strategies to cost shocks. But the more important
feature of the model is that the distribution of prices will also change when con-
sumers' priors relative to the true state of the economy change. This means that
the demand elasticities of consumers will depend on previous cost realizations, al-
lowing ﬁrms to react asymmetrically to cost shocks.
Similarly to the model I provided in Section 3 and the model discussed by Yang
and Ye, the probability α of the high cost state will be ρ if there were high costs in
the last period and 1− ρ if there were low costs in the last period, with 0 < ρ < 1.
As consumers always get to know the previous period's cost realizations and adapt
their beliefs immediately, there are only four diﬀerent states of the economy to con-
sider. If one again denotes the low cost state by L and high cost state by H, these
states (ct−1, ct) are {LL,LH,HL,HH}. Also, the search intensity of consumers
will only depend on the previous period's cost state.
In this setting, it is easy to verify that it will take only two periods for prices to
fully adjust to some cost shock. In the period where the cost shock happens
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(say t), consumers will have some (distorted) prior about the current cost realiza-
tion and ﬁrms will adapt to the cost change by modifying their price distribution
accordingly, both taking into account the new cost level and consumers' beliefs.
But if the new cost state persists, consumers get to know the true state in t+1, ad-
just their search intensity and lead ﬁrms to price optimally given the (now correct)
beliefs of consumers. Thus, in order for pricing asymmetry to exist, asymmetry
must be found in the very period where the cost shock happens (i.e., in the ﬁrst
period with the new cost state).
More explicitly, adjustment asymmetry will be prevalent if the expected absolute
change of the average price in the market is bigger for positive cost shocks than for
negative ones. For this, it has to be considered that a positive cost shock can only
happen if the previous period's costs were low, i.e., the cost state must have been
LL or HL and change to LH. Analogously, a negative cost shock can only happen
if the economy's state was LH or HH and changes to HL. Overall, Tappata is
able to determine the diﬀerence of the expected absolute change of the average
market price after a positive cost shock compared to a negative cost shock as
E[|∆p| |∆c > 0]−E[|∆p| |∆c < 0] = −ρ(1− ρ)
2
[(pHH−pHL)−(pLH−pLL)] (4.19)
where pxy denotes the average market price under the respective cost state xy.
The usual case of a slower adaption to negative cost shocks is thus found if the
above expression is larger than zero. It is possible to decompose the sign of (4.19)
such that it will only depend on the sign of the following: −ρ(1−ρ)
2
(cH − cL) times
i) [t]he eﬀect of previous cost realization on consumers' priors, ii) the
eﬀect of those priors on the equilibrium search intensity, and iii) the
eﬀect of the search intensity on the cost pass-through. (Tappata, 2009,
p. 682)
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As mentioned earlier, the eﬀect of consumers' priors α on the search intensity µ
is clearly negative ( ∂µ
∂α
< 0) while it is obvious that the eﬀect of the change of
previous period's costs (compared to the period before that) on consumers priors
is positive ( ∆α
∆ct−1
> 0) if costs are persistent, i.e., ρ > 1/2. What remains is the
eﬀect of the search intensity on the cost pass-through. Using expected market
prices for given cost realizations c and consumers' priors α, Tappata is able to
derive this equilibrium pass-through of costs. To be precise, he shows that
∂E(p|c)
∂c
= 1− 1− µ
2µ
log
[
1 + µ
1− µ
]
≥ 0. (4.20)
As the pass-through of costs (given some cost level c) is dependent on the expected
elasticity of demand faced by ﬁrms and this elasticity of demand increases with
the search intensity µ, the cost pass-through will positively depend on µ (this can
easily be shown by diﬀerentiating (4.20) with respect to µ). Using L'Hôpital's rule,
one can also show that the pass-through for perfect competition (µ = 1) is one
and the pass-through for the monopoly case (µ = 0) is zero, as expected.
Because of the above results, the sign of Equation (4.19) will solely depend on
−ρ(1−ρ)
2
(that is, the process that drives α). Because the sign of this expression is
negative, the overall sign of (4.19) will be positive (negative, positive, positive and
negative yields positive).
In other words, adjustment asymmetry to cost shocks in the traditional sense can
be found in the dynamic setting. Again, the intuition for this is that ﬁrms face
higher demand elasticities in periods where a positive cost shock has happened
than in periods where a negative cost shock has. This is because high costs in the
previous period (i.e., a negative price shock) lead consumers to search too little
as they expect costs to remain high. In contrast, consumers will search too much
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when a positive cost shock has happened, leading ﬁrms to substantially increase
prices. Note that while there is pattern asymmetry in this model (with a diﬀerent
immediate price reaction to cost shocks), no timing or amount asymmetry can be
found. After two periods, prices and beliefs will always return to the long-run
equilibrium values.
Summary and Discussion Tappata's model is able to explain an asymmetric
response of retail prices to random cost shocks if cost shocks are persistent. In or-
der to do so, Tappata models the demand elasticities faced by ﬁrms such that they
depend on past cost realizations observed by consumers. As consumers always ob-
serve the true cost realizations with a delay of one period, Tappata's model is in a
way more elementary than Yang & Ye's. While in citetyang, it would (in principle)
be necessary to trace the past beliefs of a continuum of consumers for all elapsed
periods,32 Tappata only needs to distinguish between four states of the economy.
In each state, the beliefs of consumers are uniquely determined and will either be
correct (if no cost shock took place at the beginning of the period) or distorted.
This leads ﬁrms to adapt diﬀerently to positive and negative cost shocks as the
search intensity of consumers and thus the demand elasticities faced by ﬁrms will
depend on consumers' beliefs about present costs, which will be distorted if a cost
shock happened.
I want to emphasize one more time that this simpliﬁcation in Tappata's model
comes at the price that cost shocks are always absorbed within two periods. While
Yang & Ye are able to model a slow adaption of output prices to a negative cost
(while positive shocks are fully priced in after one period), prices will immediately
32Yang & Ye overcome this technical problem by assuming a continuum of ﬁrms, which in turn
implies some theoretical objections (outlined in the discussion of the last subsection).
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jump to their stable values after a one time shock in Tappata's economy in the
following period. Empirically, the latter adjustment pattern cannot be conﬁrmed.
There are some other diﬀerences between Yang & Ye's and Tappata's model. First,
while Yang & Ye use a continuum of ﬁrms to derive equilibrium in their paper,
Tappata focuses on the case of only two ﬁrms. Although his results carry over to
the case with more than two ﬁrms in the market, some of the implications of this
are quite awkward. While an increased number of ﬁrms is usually associated with
a better functioning of markets (reaching perfect competition in the limit), it can
be shown that an increased number of ﬁrms in the model economy actually raises
average prices for given search intensities µ.
The expected cost pass-through of prices can also be proven to diminish for in-
creasing n, implying that atomistic markets will have a very slow adaption to cost
shocks for values of µ that are not close to unity. Depending on how the exact
distribution of search costs for consumers looks like, this implies that the model
makes a prediction for competitive markets that cannot be conﬁrmed by reality if
there is even a small fraction of consumers that ﬁnds it unproﬁtable to search in
any case.
Another discrepancy between the models is that Tappata uses no capacity con-
straints of ﬁrms to derive his results. An important objection to Yang & Ye's model
was that each ﬁrm pricing the (for each state uniquely determined) low price p
had to be capacity constrained. Clearly this is quite an implausible assumption
for most retail markets. Another problem was that each ﬁrm was assumed to have
the same capacity constraint, which is an unrealistic assumption. Tappata in turn
needs no capacity constraints at all, which seems clearly superior.
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Possible extensions to Tappata's model would be the consideration of oligopolistic
behavior among ﬁrms for small n, an imperfect learning process for consumers or
the incorporation of dynamic learning that is inﬂuenced by past search decisions
(consumers who have searched in the past might recognize cost levels more accu-
rately than consumers who have not). Also, a mechanism could be conceived that
ensures that average prices will not rise once the number of ﬁrms rises beyond
some point.
Overall, Tappata's model can be understood as a concise theoretical work that is
able to explain asymmetric pricing in competitive markets while only relying on
few limiting assumptions. Although some of the model's predictions are not in
accordance to the behavior of real markets, Tappata provides a very interesting
starting point for future research in the area of asymmetric pricing caused by con-
sumer search. In contrast, Yang and Ye rely on more limiting assumptions, but
are able to achieve results that closer match current empirical evidence.
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4.3 Other Consumer Search Models
4.3.1 A Reference Price Search Model with Asymmetric Pricing
In a yet unpublished working paper, Lewis (2009) suggests a reference price con-
sumer search model that results in asymmetric pricing. The basic mechanism
which is employed in Lewis' model is as follows. Consumers observe one random
price in the market for free, but have to pay positive search cost if they want to
see another price quotation.
Most importantly, unlike in the consumers search models that were discussed
above, consumers are not acting fully rationally: they do not know the random
process with which ﬁrms' costs are determined and thus base their expectations
of current prices on the prices they have observed in previous periods, using some
prior distribution of prices that can be diﬀerent from their actual distribution. In
the model, expectations need to be biased in order to produce asymmetric pric-
ing. Given these expectations, both consumers and ﬁrms act rationally. However,
wrong expectations lead consumers to either search too much or search too little
when costs change.
In particular, consumers who observe a price that is lower than the price they paid
in the last period will assume that there is only a small chance of ﬁnding an even
lower price when searching, implying that fewer consumers will search. Thus, ﬁrms
can get away with higher margins because there will be less competition among
them (the fewer consumers search, the more incentive a ﬁrm has to price high, as
it doesn't care about the small fraction of searching customers it loses to a ﬁrm
that prices lower). Basically, if costs drop signiﬁcantly, ﬁrms only need to reduce
prices a little to keep consumers from searching, and thus negative costs shocks
are transmitted slowly to output prices.
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On the other hand, if there is a signiﬁcant positive cost shock, ﬁrms will have to
adapt their prices instantaneously because margins are squeezed and would be-
come negative otherwise. As no consumer would expect such a big rise in costs,
every consumer would choose to search after observing the ﬁrst price, implying
that the only price ﬁrms can charge in equilibrium are the marginal costs ﬁrms
are facing, meaning that a full information Bertrand-type scenario results.
Overall, asymmetric pricing has to emerge: output prices react immediately to
`large' (in relation to margins) positive cost shocks, but slowly adapt to large neg-
ative cost shocks. If cost shocks are small relative to margins, there will be a slow
decline of market prices no matter whether costs rise or fall.
Lewis' model of asymmetric pricing has one major implication. As mentioned
above, his model predicts that prices should only follow changes in marginal costs
when costs have risen signiﬁcantly (such that ﬁrms need to price higher in order
to avoid making losses) or have fallen slightly. If costs drop excessively, ﬁrms will
choose to decrease them just as much to ensure that no consumer searches, gener-
ating high margins. If costs rise slightly but margins are very high, ﬁrms will opt
to further decrease their selling prices in order to avoid generating search.
In other words, prices will only be sensitive to cost shocks if margins are small.
If margins are small and a positive cost shock happens, ﬁrms need to adapt their
output prices immediately in order to retain a positive price-cost margin. If mar-
gins are small and costs decline, prices will fall slightly (in concordance with costs)
because ﬁrms try to prevent search.
However, if margins are high and a (large) negative or (small) positive cost shock
happens, ﬁrms will optimally react to consumers biased expectations by slightly
reducing their prices in an attempt to discourage search.
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Lewis' main ﬁnding hence is that margin size, rather than the sign of a cost shock,
is the main driving force behind the speed of price transmission to cost changes.
The phenomenon of asymmetric pricing is only apparent because small margins
(implying a quick response to cost shocks) usually correlate with cost increases,
while high margins (implying slow price adjustment) correlate with cost decreases.
Interestingly, Lewis' model predicts similar dynamics to the dynamics obtained by
the collusive trigger sales model proposed by Borenstein et al. (1997), which I tried
to formalize in Section 3. If costs decrease signiﬁcantly in the model (i.e., costs
drop from cH to cL), ﬁrms start colluding on the old equilibrium price, with aver-
age prices decreasing slowly because of random demand shocks. As a consequence,
a signiﬁcant negative cost shock leads to high margins and a slow transmission of
prices, just as in the model of Lewis.
On the other hand, if costs rise by a signiﬁcant amount, margins drop to zero and
ﬁrms must behave competitively, pricing at cost without delay. This means that
a large increase in costs has an immediate eﬀect on prices and goes hand in hand
with low margins, again just like in Lewis' model.
It has to be noted, however, that my model is only able to diﬀerentiate between
two cost states, which was necessary to allow for a unique focal point on which
ﬁrms can collude once costs drop. Therefore, no statement can be made about
what the eﬀect of a small cost decrease under high margins would be, as in the
model, high margins can only be found if costs are already low. Analogously, low
margins coupled with a signiﬁcant cost increase are impossible too, as zero mar-
gins can only occur if costs are already high. However, low margins coupled with
a cost increase should naturally lead to a rise in prices, as margins would become
negative otherwise.
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Also, Lewis ﬁnds that the consumer search models of Yang and Ye (2008) and
Tappata (2009) contradict some of the implications of his model, at least if they
are generalized to an arbitrary amount of diﬀerent cost states:
In the Tappata (2008) and Yang and Ye (2008) models, more search and
faster price response occur when dispersion is largest, and dispersion
is inversely related to marginal cost. Therefore, a more generalized
version of these models would predict that prices respond more quickly
to cost changes when margins are high than when they are low. This
contradicts Prediction 2 of the reference price search model. (Lewis,
2009, p.17)
Now that I've compared the implications of Lewis' model to those of the models
explained above, I want to brieﬂy address two of its problematic issues. First,
as mentioned before, the consumers in his model are not perfectly rational in the
sense that consumers' expectations always need to be biased in order to generate
equilibria where asymmetric pricing occurs. Such an assumption is not needed by
the consumer search models discussed before.
Second, Lewis assumes that ﬁrms are myopic in the sense that in each period,
they try to maximize their proﬁt without taking into account supergame strate-
gies. This assumption eﬀectively destroys any possibility of collusion in the model.
But models where consumers have wrong expectations would certainly be prone
for collusive strategies, which is ignored completely.
Overall, while Lewis' model provides a plausible alternative mechanism for asym-
metric pricing, some of its assumptions are probably not justiﬁed for many markets.
On the other hand, it generates empirical implications that can easily be tested.
This is also done in Lewis (2009), where the author is able to conﬁrm most of his
model's predictions. While this doesn't mean that other models of asymmetric
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pricing are wrong or inferior to the one of Lewis, his empirical research points
out several key implications any model of asymmetric pricing should be able to
provide. Most importantly, Lewis ﬁnds that the speed of price adjustment to costs
is typically dependent on margin size. This in turn should help researchers in the
development of better or more general models of asymmetric pricing.
4.3.2 Asymmetric Pricing caused by Sticky Consumer Prices
Cabral and Fishman (2008) provide a model of sticky consumer prices when input
prices are sticky. Under certain conditions, they show that the model also implies
asymmetric price transmission in the traditional sense (i.e., a faster response to
positive cost shocks), however only if input cost changes are small.
The underlying principle of the model is as follows: if a ﬁrm's input cost increases
by a small amount, it might be optimal for the ﬁrm to refrain from increasing its
output price to the new optimal level, as an increased price might lead consumers
to search. If the expected proﬁt loss caused by searching consumers (buying at
another ﬁrm) exceeds the expected additional proﬁt caused by adapting prices to
the new optimal level, ﬁrms should not increase prices.
In contrast, if costs decrease by a small amount, ﬁrms have no incentive to cut
prices because consumers optimally decide not to search after they observe un-
changed prices. This is the basic mechanism why prices are sticky in the model.
Asymmetric price transmission ﬁnally occurs if cost changes are correlated across
competing ﬁrms. In principle, if costs are suﬃciently correlated, the signal of a
slightly increased price tells consumers that market prices have likely increased
in general (due to a positive cost shock), implying that consumers might ﬁnd it
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optimal not to search. Because of this, ﬁrms can immediately react to positive
cost shocks by increasing their selling prices. On the other hand, the dynamics
of the model ensure that a small decrease in costs bears no incentive for ﬁrms to
reduce their prices, as consumers will refrain from search anyway if prices don't
change at all.
It can be shown though that no large price increase can be found in the model,
which is an implication that is very diﬀerent from those of all other models dis-
cussed in this thesis. Also, price decreases are typically large in the model, which
is again diﬀerent to the results of the other models discussed.
Overall, the model of Cabral and Fishman predicts the following behavior, which
can also be tested empirically:
 Small cost decreases are transmitted with lag whereas small cost increases
are transmitted to prices instantaneously. Large cost decreases or large cost
increases do not yield asymmetric price adjustment.
 Cost changes and price changes have a higher correlation if costs are increas-
ing than if costs are decreasing.
 Price decreases are typically less frequent than price increases, but price
decreases tend to be larger in magnitude.
 Prices decreases are only less frequent than price increases if costs change by
a small amount. If costs change signiﬁcantly, no such asymmetry is found.
 Asymmetric price adjustment is only found if costs are (very) sticky.
Out of those, only implications two and ﬁve are shared by most of the models
that have been discussed. While Cabral and Fishman provide empirical support
for some of the other results, I think that implications one and four are somewhat
awkward. It seems unlikely that adjustment asymmetry should only be found if
cost changes are small. Intuitively, the other way round seems more plausible: a
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large cost increase needs to be transmitted immediately to prices in order for ﬁrms
to avoid making losses whereas a large cost decrease can be exploited to achieve
high margins for several periods.
Implication three is quite interesting though because it seems to resemble the
pricing behavior in some markets where prices ﬂuctuate much. For example, re-
tail gasoline stations are often said to behave as follows: in the morning, prices
are lowest but they continuously increase by small amounts throughout the day.
Signiﬁcant price drops are typically only found at early morning or after weekends.
While I have no empirical support for this claim, if retail gasoline stations and
other ﬁrms do in fact act like this, the model of Cabral and Fishman does a good
job to capture the eﬀect. Also, all other models I have discussed predict the
opposite behavior: price increases are typically large and non-recurring, whereas
prices decreases are small and recurring until minimum costs are reached eventu-
ally, given some persistent lower cost level.
Thus, the model of Cabral and Fishman, although not speciﬁcally designed to
yield asymmetric price transmission, provides a diﬀerent mechanism to explain
asymmetric pricing which is worth considering for future research.
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5 Miscellaneous Sources for Asymmetric Price Adjustment
Now that several models of the two most common explanations for asymmetric
pricing, namely oligopolistic coordination and imperfect consumer search, have
been discussed, I want to brieﬂy present some alternative ideas to model the phe-
nomenon. In this last theoretical section of my thesis, I will describe the intuition
behind three diﬀerent and unrelated mechanism that might lead to asymmetric
pricing.
In Subsection 5.1, I will start by presenting an idea of Borenstein et al. (1997),
where asymmetric pricing is suggested to be the result of a slow adaption of pro-
duction to cost shocks. In Subsection 5.2, I will point out a model of Ball and
Mankiw (1994), in which asymmetric price adjustment is caused by asymmetric
menu costs under inﬂation. Finally and probably most interestingly, I will discuss
a model of Eckert (2002) in Subsection 5.3. There, pricing patterns that resemble
rockets and feathers emerge in highly competitive markets as the result of price
wars in which ﬁrms battle over market share. Also, as will be seen, an extension
of the model considered could lead to `true' asymmetric pricing.
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5.1 Asymmetric Pricing due to Lags in Adjustment of Production and
Finite Inventories
One alternative mechanism that could result in asymmetric was already given by
Borenstein et al. (1997). In their second hypothesis, they argue that
[p]roduction lags and ﬁnite inventories of gasoline imply that negative
shocks to the future optimal gasoline consumption path can be acco-
modated more quickly than positive shocks. (Borenstein et al., 1997,
p. 327)
While their paper concentrates on the gasoline market, this concept could also be
extended to other branches.
In short, if a severe supply shock happens, asymmetric price adjustment could
result because it might take some time in order to adapt production to future op-
timal consumption. To see this, consider a signiﬁcant positive supply shock ﬁrst,
e.g. because production costs drop sharply. Then, it is clear that future output
prices will have to sink eventually. However, prices cannot fall as much in the
short run because inventories are ﬁnite and it will take a couple of days or weeks
to alter production to increase output. This implies that negative cost shocks are
transmitted slowly to selling prices.
On the other hand, if a severe negative supply shock happens (e.g., because produc-
tion costs increase sharply), ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably decrease current production.
However, they can simply choose to raise prices immediately (building up inven-
tories) in an attempt to cover their increased expenses later. This leads to a quick
rise in prices once production costs rise.
Overall, an asymmetric price adjustment to (signiﬁcant) cost changes will be found.
The above mechanism is certainly interesting because it diﬀers greatly from all
other explications of rockets and feathers presented in this thesis. I think that for
markets with severe production bottlenecks, high market concentration and sig-
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niﬁcant supply or demand shocks, it could turn out to be one of the main driving
forces behind asymmetric price adjustment.
However, most retail markets are characterized by diﬀerent conditions: in many
cases, there are no production bottlenecks and retailers can choose to buy virtu-
ally unlimited amounts of the commodity they obtain from wholesale. Also, severe
supply or demand shocks are likely uncommon in many markets. As a result, the
hypothesis seems worth considering for future research, but is unlikely to describe
asymmetric pricing in every or a majority of markets.
5.2 Asymmetric Pricing due to Asymmetric Menu Costs
Ball and Mankiw (1994) propose a partial equilibrium model of asymmetric price
adjustment that is caused by asymmetric menu costs under positive trend inﬂa-
tion. The intuition behind their model is as follows. If inﬂation is positive and a
ﬁrm wishes to decrease its price relative to the aggregate price level (e.g. because
of a negative cost shock), it can simply wait until its desired relative price level is
reached. This is possible because positive trend inﬂation increases the aggregate
price level and thus reduces relative prices over time. If the ﬁrm wishes to increase
its relative price level, however, it has to oﬀset the inﬂation in the market and the
gap to its new desired relative price. It cannot wait until its desired relative price
level is reached because, in the absence of another shock to its desired price, this
gap would become wider and wider.
If there are no menu costs in the model, ﬁrms would simply set their relative price
equal to their desired price in every period. But if there are menu costs which are
large enough to have an eﬀect on the choice of whether to change prices or not,
asymmetric pricing will occur: price adjustment will be proﬁtable more frequently
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when there is a positive shock to the desired relative price compared to a negative
shock, and if prices are adjusted, adjustment will be larger under positive shocks.
While the simplicity of this model is certainly appealing, I don't believe that it is
able to capture the true mechanism that leads to asymmetric pricing. The main
reason for this is that inﬂation rates are usually very small compared to changes
in input and output prices. Costs and other determinants of desired relative prices
tend to ﬂuctuate so much, in relation to their levels, that a typical single-digit
inﬂation rate could never hope to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the adjustment of
output prices.
Also, menu costs are likely very small in the great majority of retail markets. For
example, a gasoline retail station that wants to adjust its selling price is probably
not worried about the cost this change of price creates. In fact, I think that menu
costs (in the traditional sense) are much too small to have an inﬂuence on the
decision of changing prices in most markets were input prices ﬂuctuate regularly.
Thus, in sum, I don't think that the model of Ball and Mankiw (1994) will play a
crucial role in identifying the sources of asymmetric pricing.
5.3 Edgeworth Price Cycles Resembling Asymmetric Pricing
Finally, a very interesting alternative to rockets and feathers was provided by
Eckert (2002). In his model, a pattern similar to asymmetric pricing emerges
although prices move more or less independently from costs. In the model, ﬁrms'
price setting is characterized by two diﬀerent regimes,
an undercutting regime, in which ﬁrms battle over market share, and
an increasing regime, in which ﬁrms cease battling for the market and
instead choose to restore temporarily high prices. (Eckert, 2002, p. 64)
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In other words, ﬁrms slightly undercut each other in the former regime, leading
to a slow decline of average market prices until prices are close to marginal cost.
Once they are suﬃciently close to it, ﬁrms stop undercutting, price at cost and
begin a `war of attrition'. During this war, ﬁrms randomize between continuing
to price at cost or increasing prices to a much higher level. Once one of the ﬁrms
does so, it loses most or all of its market share for the next period, but the other
ﬁrms in the market quickly follow to price at the high level. This is how the in-
creasing regime is characterized. Once all prices have reached the highest level, a
new undercutting regime starts.
Overall, the pattern of price movements that emerges (see Figure 5.1) can get con-
fused with asymmetric pricing if input costs are unobservable: price decreases are
small and the lowest price in the cycle is approached slowly whereas price increases
are large, almost simultaneous and prices jump to the highest price in the cycle.
As argued above, Edgeworth price cycles can look like rockets and feathers even
though prices move independently from costs.33 Also, following the author's argu-
mentation, these cycles should mainly be found in the most competitive markets,
whereas less competitive markets should rather be characterized by sticky or con-
stant prices. Consequently, if Edgeworth price cycles are the correct explanation
for a perceived asymmetric price adjustment, policy makers could make a big
mistake by (only) punishing ﬁrms who compete in markets where such a pricing
behavior is apparent.
The pattern Eckert describes in his model has nothing to do with `true' asymmet-
ric pricing, which is the sole focus of my thesis. However, it is straightforward to
33If marginal cost is constant, only the lowest price in the cycle will be a function of cost.
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see that an extension of his model could lead to rockets and feathers in the tradi-
tional sense. If marginal cost is not assumed to be constant, but can change with
a suﬃciently low probability, Eckert argues that ﬁrms will not alter the strategy
outlined above in equilibrium. If costs change unexpectedly while ﬁrms are in the
undercutting regime (which they are most of the time), it seems reasonable to
think that the undercutting regime would continue until the new marginal cost is
reached, given that prices are still above cost. This is because ﬁrms try to steal
market shares in the undercutting regime, which shouldn't be aﬀected by lower or
higher marginal cost. If marginal cost rises to such an extent that margins become
negative, however, ﬁrms are expected to immediately increase prices to the (new)
highest point of the cycle.
In sum, asymmetric price adjustment will be found: negative cost shocks are trans-
mitted slowly to selling prices (as the undercutting regime is simply prolonged)
whereas positive cost shocks can have an immediate eﬀect on prices if margins
become negative. But even if not, the undercutting regime lasts shorter, meaning
that positive cost shocks will be transmitted more quickly to output prices than
negative ones. This implies asymmetric pricing in the traditional sense.
In summary, I think that Edgeworth price cycles à la Eckert (2002) might turn out
to be one of the most important sources of asymmetric pricing in highly competitive
markets. If such cycles were found to be common in many competitive markets,
the theory of asymmetric pricing would have to be reconsidered. Then, other
explanations like implicit collusion or costly consumer search would lose much of
their appeal.
On the other hand, if cost shocks were usually found to be transmitted in the
classic sense of rockets and feathers, with only few markets exhibiting a pattern of
Edgeworth price cycles, new theories would be needed to pin down the reasons that
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discern classical asymmetric pricing from asymmetric pricing caused by Edgeworth
cycles. In any case, a lot of further empirical and theoretical research will be
necessary to give a better understanding of the issue.
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6 Summary and Conclusion
In this thesis, the phenomenon of asymmetric adjustment of output prices to input
price shocks was examined in detail. After pointing out why asymmetric pricing
is a relevant topic in contemporaneous economic research in the introduction, I
started out by providing a deﬁnition and distinction between the various types of
the so called pattern of rockets and feathers.
In the main section of this work, I proceeded to develop a model of oligopolis-
tic coordination that resulted in asymmetric price adjustment. In particular, my
intention was to bridge the gap between the numerous research papers that refer-
ence collusion as one of the main sources of asymmetric pricing and the absence
of any formal model that is actually able to derive asymmetric pricing caused by
collusion.
Finally, I summarized several other models that lead to rockets and feathers in
the last two sections of this thesis. While consumer search models are currently
the dominating category, other interesting ideas have been developed that might
renew our understanding of asymmetric pricing.
Overall, one can conclude that there are numerous mechanisms that could pos-
sibly result in asymmetric pricing. As of now, it is still unclear whether rockets
and feathers is a product of collusion, imperfect consumer search, miscellaneous
sources (like, for example, lags in adjustment of production or Edgeworth price
cycles) or a combination of all or some of those.
In this thesis, I was able to prove that a simple dynamic oligopoly model can lead
to asymmetric pricing. If overall demand is random and enough consumers in
a market know the prices of all competing ﬁrms, ﬁrms might ﬁnd it optimal to
collude on the price that was charged before a negative cost shock if costs drop,
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but increase prices immediately if costs increase. Due to the random component
of demand, collusion can slowly break down after a negative cost shock, leading
to asymmetric pricing.
The model I contributed shares one feature with most other models of asymmetric
pricing: a higher persistence of costs leads to a more severe adjustment asymmetry
of prices. Also, more competition in a market leads to a reduced likelihood of col-
lusion and thus asymmetric pricing, which is a plausible result. On the other hand,
the property that a higher fraction of informed consumers strengthens asymmetric
price transmission is not found in any other model I examined. While this predic-
tion of the trigger sales model may seem problematic at ﬁrst, it is not surprising in
its context: if the fraction of informed consumers is small, ﬁrms have essentially no
chance to punish deviating ﬁrms under collusion. Put diﬀerently, the trigger sales
model provides a benchmark to distinguish asymmetric pricing caused by collusion
from asymmetric pricing caused by imperfect consumer search and (at least some)
other mechanisms. Asymmetric pricing under collusion should only be found if
consumers are very well informed about the prices in a market. If consumers have
limited knowledge about them, collusion becomes a less likely explanation for the
phenomenon of rockets and feathers.
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Appendix A
A.1 Abstract
This thesis studies the phenomenon of asymmetric pricing, according to which
output prices tend to adapt quicker to input cost increases than to input cost de-
creases. Although the general public and government authorities tend to attribute
this pricing behavior to an abuse of market power, no formal model capable of
generating asymmetric pricing through collusion has been developed. The main
contribution of this thesis is to provide such a model. In my model, positive
cost shocks lead ﬁrms' margins to be squeezed, implying an immediate response
of output prices. In contrast, ﬁrms try to coordinate their prices after negative
cost shocks because the old output price provides a natural focal point for collu-
sion. However, overall market demand is random and unobservable to ﬁrms. As
a consequence, they confuse random demand shocks with demand shocks caused
by rival ﬁrms undercutting, leading collusion to eventually break down. Overall,
asymmetric pricing is the result.
Several other models of asymmetric pricing are presented in this thesis. While
consumer search models typically imply a less pronounced form of asymmetric
pricing if many consumers are informed (i.e., observe all prices in the market),
my model predicts the opposite. The reason is that collusion under random and
unobservable demand can only be maintained if ﬁrms can successfully punish a
deviating ﬁrm. This is unlikely to happen if deviation has little eﬀect, which is
the case if there are few informed consumers.
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A.2 Abstract (German)
Diese Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit dem Phänomen der asymmetrischen Preis-
transmission, welches eine schnellere Reaktion von Verkaufspreisen auf positive
Kostenschocks im Vergleich zu negativen Kostenschocks impliziert. Obwohl die
Öﬀentlichkeit sowie Regierungsstellen asymmetrische Preistransmission häuﬁg mit
Marktmissbrauch gleichsetzen, wurde bisher noch kein formales Modell entwick-
elt, welches asymmetrische Preistransmission durch Kollusion erklären kann. Der
wichtigste Beitrag dieser Arbeit is daher, ein solches Modell zu entwickeln. In
meinem Modell führen positive Kostenschocks zu einer unmittelbaren Veränderung
der Verkaufspreise, da die Verkaufsmarge sonst negativ würde. Im Gegensatz
dazu veranlassen negative Kostenshocks die Firmen, ihre Preise auf dem alten
Verkaufspreis zu koordinieren, da dieser Preis einen natürlichen Fokuspunkt für
Kollusion darstellt. Da aber in meinem Modell die Gesamtnachfrage zufällig und
unbeobachtbar ist, verwechseln die Firmen zufällige Nachfrageschocks mit Nach-
frageschocks, die durch unterbietende Firmen enstehen. Dies führt dazu, dass
Kollusion nach einer gewissen Anzahl an Perioden zusammenbricht. Insgesamt
kommt es zu asymmetrischer Preistransmission.
Diverse andere Modelle asymmetrischer Preistransmission werden ebenfalls in dieser
Diplomarbeit präsentiert. Während Consumer-Search Modelle typischerweise eine
schwächere Form von asymmetrischer Preistransmission bei einer geringen Anzahl
von informierten Konsumenten (d.h. Konsumenten, die sämtliche Preise im Markt
beobachten) implizieren, sagt mein Modell das Gegenteil voraus. Der Grund hier-
für ist, dass Kollusion unter zufälliger und unbeobachtbarer Gesamtnachfrage nur
dann aufrecht erhalten werden kann, wenn Firmen erfolgreich eine abweichende
Firma bestrafen können. Dies ist aber unwahrscheinlich, wenn Abweichung einen
sehr kleinen Eﬀekt hat, wie das bei einer geringen Anzahl von informierten Kon-
sumenten der Fall ist.
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